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CHAPTER 15 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND ITS
IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
JOHN J. CHUNG
INTRODUCTION
Swept along by the rising tide of internationalist fervor, Chapter 15 of the
United States Bankruptcy Codes became law in October 2005. Chapter 15
governs transnational bankruptcies and is applicable to the bankruptcy of a
debtor that does business in more than one country.3 Under Chapter 15, the
court of the debtor's home country arguably has authority to take control of the
entire bankruptcy case and apply its domestic bankruptcy law to all of the
debtor's assets and creditors worldwide.4 The goal of Chapter 15's proponents
is to require all of the creditors from around the world to seek repayment in the
court of the debtor's home country.5 Even creditors who engaged in
transactions exclusively within the boundaries of their own country will be
forced into foreign proceedings. 6 Chapter 15's supporters describe it as "one
court, one law.
The two major benefits to this approach, according to supporters, are
certainty and efficiency. 8 All parties know in advance which country's law will
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., 1982,
Washington University (St. Louis); J.D., 1985, Harvard Law School.
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. §
1501-32 (2006) (hereinafter "Chapter 15"). See generally John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15
of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 89 (2006) (giving a description of Chapter 15's enactment, how the "push for
internationalization" was instrumental to its enactment, and how it moved "the United States
toward a universalist approach to transnational bankruptcies").
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501. Chapter 15 was enacted by Congress on April 20, 2005, and
became effective 180 days later, on October 17, 2005. Id.
3. See id. § 1501(a). Chapter 15 states that "[t]he purpose of this chapter is ... to
provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency." Id.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1509-32 (giving the process of a Chapter 15 bankruptcy
proceeding).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'LLAW 31, 40
(2001) [hereinafter Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?]. The process set forth in
Chapter 15 is a step towards the "universalist approach." Id. at 35 (stating that "in
[universalism's] most commonly described implementation, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor
firm's home country-its courts and laws--should govern").
8. Id. at 35.
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apply in the event of bankruptcy, and the elimination of duplicative
proceedings generates supposed administrative efficiencies.
9
The supporters, however, have overlooked the first and fundamental focus
of bankruptcy law: money. Every bankruptcy case around the world is a fight
about money: How much money will creditors recover? Who will recover less?
Who will recover more? For most creditors, the whole point of the proceeding
is to figure how much they will get on the distribution date. Despite this
obvious reality, Chapter 15 contains a potentially debilitating flaw. Suppose all
of the creditors from around the world are forced to seek relief in the debtor's
home country.10 In which currency will they be paid? What pieces of paper
will they receive as payment? The short answer is that they will be paid in the
currency of the home country.I I That answer seems straightforward and
satisfactory. But will creditors find that acceptable? Are creditors indifferent to
what kind of currency they receive?
Creditors are not indifferent and in fact care deeply about the issue because
they may suffer serious prejudice due to payment in a foreign currency. The
prejudice results from the fact that currencies fluctuate in value against each
other. The fluctuations are potentially prejudicial because creditor claims are
valued and converted into the currency of the forum at one point in time, but
claims are not actually paid out until a later time, maybe even years later.
12
What happens if the currency of the forum falls in value against the currency of
the creditor's home currency? The answer is simple. When measured in its
home currency, the foreign creditor will receive less.'
3
Ordinarily, most people are not affected by currency movements because
they conduct all of their transactions in one currency. The only time most
Americans become aware of foreign exchange values is when they travel
abroad and need to exchange dollars for euros, pounds, or yen. Similarly, most
business people are not troubled by foreign exchange issues because their
business is conducted in their home country and with their home currency.
Chapter 15, however, changes that and imposes involuntary and
unavoidable foreign exchange risk on creditors. Even if a creditor extends
credit to another business in the same town, under a contract made and
governed by local law and with the obligation to repay in the local currency,
Chapter 15 imposes unavoidable currency risk on the creditor by requiring it to
9. Id. at41.
10. Chung, supra note 1, at 93-94. The home country court would have jurisdiction over
all the debtor's assets and creditors and would displace the bankruptcy laws of the other
countries where the debtor's property may be located. Id. at 94. In a Chapter 15 proceeding,
even if the debtor's property is located within a different country and the relevant legal
relationships were forged solely within that country's borders, the courts in that country would
be required to defer to the foreign proceeding in the debtor's home country. Id.
11. Id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2006) (stating that the court shall determine the amount of the
claim as of the date of the filing of the petition).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B (describing the effect of currency fluctuations).
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pursue its claim in the foreign jurisdiction where claims will be paid in foreign14
currency. In the event of material currency fluctuations, the creditor's foreign
exchange losses may result in prejudice so great that it undermines fundamental
principles of bankruptcy law.
The proponents of Chapter 15 have been silent on this issue and would
likely argue that foreign exchange risks are minimal. In order to hold this view,
however, certain conditions must be assumed. In short, the viability of Chapter
15 is based on two implicit assumptions. The first assumption is that the
currency of the foreign proceeding is convertible. After all, a distribution in a
foreign currency that cannot be converted into a creditor's local currency is
practically worthless. The second assumption is that foreign exchange rates are
stable over time. Chapter 15 implicitly assumes that a distribution in the
currency of the home country to a foreign creditor in Year Four (to pick a
random year) will constitute fair compensation for a claim valued and allowed
in Year One of the bankruptcy proceeding. However, what if the currency of
the debtor's home country depreciates significantly or even collapses against
the value of the creditor's local currency? The currency of the distribution in
Year 4 may be nothing more than worthless pieces of paper to the creditor.
Interestingly enough, it appears that early attempts at regional
harmonization of insolvency laws recognized the foreign exchange problem. 15
The Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1940 appear to have incorporated a
mechanism to mitigate foreign exchange risk. However, the proponents of
Chapter 15 ignored the issue. Contemporary American case law suggests that
forcing an American creditor into a foreign proceeding where it would receive
worthless pieces of paper as payment would violate public policy. 17 Although
this case law did not arise in the context of Chapter 15, this Article contends
that the same rationale should be applied to issues arising under Chapter 15.
From a bird's-eye view, this issue of foreign exchange risk highlights a
severe limitation to the broad application of Chapter 15 in all transnational
bankruptcies. Chapter 15 addresses a tiny part of global economic issues; it is
not a world unto itself isolated from other forces. Hence, the scope of its
application and viability must be weighed against much larger and more
powerful forces such as the foreign exchange market, acknowledging that the
foreign exchange issues hold the potential to overwhelm the effectiveness of
14. See infra note 39 (providing an example of a typical Chapter 15 proceeding).
15. See infra notes 176-198 and accompanying text (describing the Montevideo Treaty of
1889 and the Montevideo Treaties of 1940).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir.
1999) (concluding that "if the early conversion of a creditor's claims into foreign currency
would render a debt.. . valueless, we might have cause to conclude that a conversion... was
fundamentally unfair").
18. Id. at 242 (addressing a "forfaiting" transaction involving the sale of goods for
promissory notes).
2008]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Chapter 15.19 What is particularly ironic regarding Chapter 15 is that its ability
to function falls apart in situations of the greatest economic duress - namely,
situations caused by or related to currency crisis. The whole purpose of
bankruptcy law is to provide a solution and a means to deal with financial
distress at the debtor-creditor level. Yet, if and when multinational bankruptcies
are caused by currency collapse, Chapter 15 fails to adequately address the
problem.
In sum, this Article may be viewed as a challenge to Chapter 15's implicit
assumptions regarding the fixed nature and meaning of the value of money. The
foundation of bankruptcy law, which is the orderly repayment of debts, depends
on the value of the thing (in this case, money) used as repayment. Chapter 15
assumes that the currency of one country has some reliable meaning or stable
value in relation to another currency and that repayment in one currency has
meaning or value in another currency. This Article exposes the problems with
these assumptions.
Part I of this Article discusses the goals of Chapter 15 and its origins in the
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency promulgated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. It also discusses how the Model Law
arose out of the debate between the territorialist and universalist approaches to
transnational bankruptcy law and how Chapter 15 represents a significant
advance by the supporters of universalism. Part II presents the two implicit
assumptions embedded in Chapter 15 regarding the foreign exchange market. It
illustrates the foreign exchange issue using three hypothetical scenarios based
on actual currency events. It also points to recent history to show that dramatic
currency fluctuations are actually common occurrences. Part III discusses how
the foreign exchange issues may trigger Chapter 15's public policy exception
and argues for the courts to apply the exception to protect creditors from
material foreign exchange losses. Part IV highlights an additional problem
raised by foreign exchange fluctuations in a transnational bankruptcy. It
examines the possibility that foreign exchange losses may lead to violations of
the absolute priority rule, which is one of the bedrock principles of American
bankruptcy law. Part V asks whether foreign exchange issues present a genuine
problem. It begins by discussing the current state of the foreign exchange
market. It then acknowledges that foreign exchange issues have not been
widely reported in American bankruptcy cases. It points out, though, that the
territorial approach to transnational bankruptcies was in place before Chapter
15 and that one of the benefits of territorialism was that it insulated creditors
19. On average, approximately $3.2 trillion in different currencies and related financial
products are traded each day in the worldwide foreign exchange market. See BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND
DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVrTY IN APRIL 2007 (2007), http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx07.pdf The
foreign exchange market is the largest in the world, much larger than the worldwide markets for
stocks or commodities. See Justin Kuepper, Getting Started in Foreign Exchange Futures,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopediacom/articles/trading/04/102704.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2008).
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from foreign exchange risk. Because of Chapter 15, the protection of
territorialism has been eroded, and foreign exchange problems will
undoubtedly emerge. Part V also points out that the early efforts at harmonizing
transnational bankruptcy law in the Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1940
attempted to protect creditors from foreign exchange risk. Part VI explores
whether a bankruptcy trustee may protect creditors from currency losses
through hedging activities in the foreign exchange market, and it discusses the
inherent limits on a trustee's ability to utilize these financial tools. The
Conclusion argues that any attempt at a broad application of Chapter 15 must
be considered in light of the fact that transnational bankruptcies occur against a
much larger backdrop of international economic realities, such as the foreign
exchange market. The utility of Chapter 15 is necessarily limited by the larger
forces at work, and those larger forces will (and should) drive the application of
Chapter 15, not the other way around.
I. THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 1520
Chapter 15 is based on and explicitly tracks the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (the "Model Law")21 promulgated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") based in Vienna.22 In
the 1990s, the issue of cooperation in international bankruptcies became the
subject of a "working group" formed by UNCITRAL. Its goal was to
"modernize insolvency practices and laws" around the world.2 4 The efforts of
this group led to the promulgation of the Model Law at UNCITRAL's Thirtieth
Session on May 12-30, 1997.25 The Model Law was approved by resolution of
20. This section highlights a few of the main features of the law. For those interested in a
full study of the scholarly debate preceding and surrounding the enactment of Chapter 15, the
articles of Professor Lynn M. LoPucki and Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook are the leading
sources. Professor John A. E. Pottow's work is also necessary reading for anyone with an
interest in this area.
21. MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
2007).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2006); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 713, 719 (2005) [hereinafter Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last]; Jay L. Westbrook,
Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALl Principles, and The EU
Insolvency Regulation, 76 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter Westbook, Multinational
Enterprises in General Default].
23. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 719.
24. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization in
UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 42 TEx. INT'L L.J. 475, 490 (2007).
UNCITRAL's self-described overall purpose is to modernize and harmonize the rules of
international business. Id. at 490-91. It describes harmonization "as the process through which
domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability in cross-border commercial
transactions." Id. at 493.
25. Evelyn H. Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REv. 23,49
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the United Nations General Assembly later that year in December. 26 The
foundation of the Model Law is based on four themes: (1) Access, (2)
Recognition, (3) Relief, and (4) Cooperation.17 As one would expect, given the
origin of the Model Law, its proponents envision a world where each country
will adopt its own version of the Model Law. The result would be a uniform
system of bankruptcy choice of law, where each country would defer to the
foreign main proceeding in the debtor's home country.
(2005); Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 22, at 2 n.3, 3.
26. Biery et al., supra note 25, at 49.
27. IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 (2d ed. 2005).
According to Professor Fletcher, the principal themes of the Model Law are:
(a) to establish the principle that a foreign representative, holding office under an
insolvency proceeding opened under the law of one state, has a right of direct access to the
courts of other states where it may be expedient to take action of some kind;
(b) to establish basic principles and procedures for the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings and for the provision of relief and assistance in cross-border cases;
(c) to establish a positive legal framework sanctioning cooperation between courts in
different jurisdictions, and between courts and foreign representatives;
(d) to establish a framework of basic rules to be applied in cases where concurrent
insolvency proceedings take place, so that coordination can be optimized in the interests of
attaining the fairest possible outcome for all creditors and other parties concerned
(including the debtor).
Id.
28. In order to understand the motivation to create the Model Law, it may be helpful to
understand the state of transnational bankruptcy law earlier in the twentieth Century. One
commentator described it as follows:
A survey made of the present status of international bankruptcy law shows that a trustee in
bankruptcy, even if appointed by the court of the debtor's commercial domicile, has but a
slight chance to recover by legal proceedings assets that are located abroad. Only a few
countries recognize the foreign trustee's title to property of the debtor. Often the trustee is
not admitted at all by the courts as the creditors' or the estate's legal representative with
power to claim the assets. If admitted, his rights are rarely sustained against local creditors
attaching local assets. In some countries the trustee can qualify as the legal representative
of the foreign bankruptcy in submitting himself to an exequatur proceeding, but liens
secured by attachment before his qualification are sustained. Almost nowhere does a
foreign bankruptcy, even when declared by the court of the commercial domicile of the
debtor, preclude another bankruptcy declaration by a local court having bankruptcy
jurisdiction. No collaboration is guaranteed between the several administrations in the case
of concurrent bankruptcies. As each bankruptcy court follows its own law, the same claim
can be void in one proceeding and valid in another.
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 58, 59-60 (1944) (footnote
omitted). Such a state of transnational bankruptcy is what the drafters of the Model Law sought
to improve. Before the promulgation of the Model Law, some courts attempted to address the
problems of cross-border cooperation and coordination on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., In re
Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1053 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "bankruptcy courts
may best be able to effectuate the purposes of bankruptcy law by cooperating with foreign
courts on a case-by-case basis"). The Model Law may be viewed as an attempt to establish a
formal and regular system of international cooperation and coordination.
[Vol. 76:67
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Chapter 15, enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, became effective on October 17, 2005.29
Entitled "Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,' 30 Chapter 15 applies to the
bankruptcy of an American multinational corporation or a foreign multinational
corporation with assets or operations in the United States.
3 1
Section 1501(a) enumerates the five objectives of Chapter 15: (1)
cooperation between U.S. courts and foreign courts; (2) "greater legal certainty
for trade and investment"; (3) "fair and efficient administration of cross-border
insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested
entities, including the debtor"; (4) "protection and maximization of the value of
the debtor's assets"; and (5) "facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled
businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving employment."
32
Chapter 15 requires American courts to "cooperate to the maximum extent
possible with a foreign court or a foreign representative."
' 33
A Chapter 15 case is commenced with a petition to the court by a foreign
representative for "recognition" of a foreign proceeding. 34 Chapter 15 focuses
29. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). The drafters of Chapter 15 tried to avoid changing the language of
the Model Law, even where alternative language would have been consistent with American
statutory style and practice. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 719-20 (stating
that "[any departures from the actual text of the Model Law ... were as narrow and limited as
possible").
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006). The term "ancillary" generally refers to a limited proceeding
that is designed to assist a "foreign main proceeding." Biery et al., supra note 25, at 31. "Once
an ancillary proceeding is invoked, the domestic court's primary responsibility is to aid the
foreign court in administering the debtor's assets .... In contrast to the ancillary proceeding,
parallel proceedings are full domestic insolvencies.., in each country where the debtor has
assets." Id. at 31-32; see also Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra
note 22, at 5, 10 (comparing universalism, or "ancillary proceedings," to territorialism, or
"parallel proceedings").
The use of the word "ancillary" in the title of Chapter 15 indicates that the purpose of the
legislation is to promote "a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor,
where a main proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in
aid of the main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies ... in each state
where assets are found." H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 107-08 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 171; see also Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default,
supra note 22, at 10-12 (describing "ancillary" and "parallel" proceedings).
31. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 715 (noting how "the sweep of
Chapter 15 is very broad" and it will apply "whenever there is a foreign insolvency proceeding
relating to a debtor that is subject to a bankruptcy case of some kind in the United States").
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)-(5).
33. Id. § 1525(a). "Perhaps the most innovative provision in the chapter is the
authorization for the courts, as well as a trustee or DIP [debtor in possession], to communicate
directly with the foreign court and trustee [pursuant to §§ 1525 and 1526]." Westbrook, Chapter
15 at Last, supra note 22, at 723.
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504, 1515(a). "Foreign proceeding" and "foreign representative" are
defined in § 101(23) and (24).
2008]
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on what is referred to as a "foreign main proceeding," 35 defined as "a foreign
proceeding 6pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main
interests." Chapter 15 contemplates that a debtor's center of main interests
will be its place of incorporation, unless contrary proof is provided. 37 The
recognition of a foreign main proceeding is a key event in a Chapter 15
bankruptcy because it decides the governing bankruptcy law. 38 If the debtor
obtains recognition of a foreign main proceeding, the bankruptcy law of its
home country will govern the case.
39
35. Id. § 1502(4). Chapter 15 also governs a "foreign nonmain proceeding," defined as "a
foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor
has an establishment." Id. § 1502(5); Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 717
(comparing and contrasting "main" versus "nonmain" proceedings). An "establishment" is
defined as "any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic
activity." 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2). As one would expect, the recognition of a foreign main
proceeding triggers more provisions of Chapter 15 than a foreign nonmain proceeding. See id. §
1520.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4). The phrase "center of its main interests," a phrase not previously
found in American jurisprudence, is an example of the almost verbatim adoption of the language
of the Model Law. See Westbook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 719.
37. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 22, at 14.
Professor Westbrook has likened the "center of its main interests" test to the more familiar
"principal place of business" test used in the United States, and he predicts that the Model Law
language will be no more difficult to apply than the familiar American test. See Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2276, 2316 (2000)
[hereinafter Westbrook, A Global Solution].
38. See Chung, supra note 1, at 97-98. Recognition of a foreign main proceeding triggers
a number of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the automatic stay and the foreign
representative's right to operate the American part of the debtor's business. Id.
39. Id. at 98. A typical case resolved under Chapter 15 looks something like the
following:
[A] Canadian company with its headquarters in Toronto commences bankruptcy
proceedings in Canada. It has one widget-making factory in Canada, and one in the United
States. Each of the factories has unpaid employees and suppliers. The American factory
secures a bank loan from an American lender, and the Canadian factory secures a loan
from a Canadian bank. The Canadian representative applies for recognition of a foreign
main proceeding under Chapter 15. The American court grants the application. All
proceedings and creditor actions in the United States are stayed, and the Canadian
representative takes control of all United States assets and operates the American factory.
The American creditors then pursue their claims in the Canadian proceeding. The
Canadian judge has jurisdiction over all the assets and creditors[, applies Canadian
bankruptcy law to the entire case,] and resolves all claims together.
[Vol. 76:67
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A. Chapter 15 's Place in the Debate between the Territorialist and the
Universalist Approaches to Transnational Bankruptcies
In order to understand the context out of which Chapter 15 arose and its
potential consequences, it is necessary to understand territorialism and
universalism, the two competing and opposite models of international
bankruptcy jurisdiction that define the debate.4° This understanding is
necessary because the "Model Law makes universalism the foundation of the
United States' international bankruptcy policy.' '41 Universalism is best
understood by contrasting it to territorialism.
Territorialism is simply the traditional practice of nations exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over parties and assets within their borders.42 It is the
default rule in every substantive area of law, including bankruptcy. 43 It rests
upon traditional notions of national sovereignty, which means that the law of
the sovereign is imposed on all people and property within its territorial
reach. 44 In a transnational bankruptcy conducted under the principles of
territorialism, each country decides, pursuant to its own laws, how the debtor's
assets within its territory will be treated in the face of creditor claims, without
deference to any foreign proceeding involving the same debtor.45
40. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2218-21 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality]. See generally Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 37
(discussing universalism); John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for
International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935 (2006) [hereinafter Pottow, Procedural
Incrementalism] (discussing the Model Law's "incrementalist and procedurally animated
approach" to universalism).
41. Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 143 (2005)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Universalism Unravels].
42. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 40, at 2218; Frederick
Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEo. WASH. INT'LL. REv. 555,561
(2001) [hereinafter Tung, Fear of Commitment].
43. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 40, at 2218.
44. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 22, at 5. To its
detractors, territorialism is referred to pejoratively as the "grab rule" because each nation's court
"grabs" the assets within its jurisdiction for distribution under its own laws. Andrew T. Guzman,
International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179 (2000);
Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 40, at 944-45.
45. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 40, at 2218; Tung, Is
International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 7, at 40. The following is a simple example of
territorialism:
Suppose a business has assets in both Country A and Country B but only files a bankruptcy
petition in Country A. The laws of Country A will govern the disposition of assets within
its territory, but the assets in Country B will not be affected by the filing. The creditors in
Country B may move to seize the assets in Country B notwithstanding the bankruptcy
filing in Country A. In order to protect its assets in Country B, the business will need to
commence a separate bankruptcy proceeding in that country which would proceed under
the laws of Country B. Thus, there would be two separate and independent proceedings,
2008]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Universalism, on the other hand, is based on the concept of "one law, one
court. ' ,4 6 It envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor's "home
country," where a single court applies the bankruptcy law of its country and
makes a "unified worldwide distribution to creditors through liquidation or
reorganization. "4 That court would have globaliurisdiction over all of the
debtor's assets and creditors, wherever located. 4Creditors will supposedl
benefit through increased legal predictability and economic efficiencies.
Universalism requires a country to defer to a foreign legal proceeding, even
with respect to property within its own territory and legal relationships formed
and conducted wholly within its own borders. This result is the stated goal of
Chapter 15.
II. CHAPTER 15's IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
Because of the enactment of Chapter 15, the universalists believe they are
well on the way to creating a seamless, efficient system of addressing
transnational bankruptcies. 1 The universalists praise the potential efficiencies
of resolving all creditor claims in one proceeding. 52 They claim that proof of
each applying a different law.
Id.
46. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 7, at 40. As one scholar has
noted,
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmonization of one worldwide,
substantive law of bankruptcy. The most common model ofuniversalism, however, follows
a pluralist route. Sidestepping the issue of which substantive provisions the ideal
bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects from one of the pre-existing bankruptcy
regimes ex post. To the extent that other courts are needed (to give legal force to the orders
of the courts of the governing jurisdiction), such courts could convene
ancillary proceedings designed to effectuate the controlling court's orders. The current
universalist paradigm thus concedes the divergence of present domestic bankruptcy laws
and advocates only a pluralist system of choice-of-law; its theory does not envision (or rely
upon) substantive harmonization of those bankruptcy laws.
Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 40, at 948 (footnotes omitted).
47. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L.
REv. 625,625-26 (2005) [hereinafter Westbrook, Universalism]; see also Guzman, supra note
44, at 2179.
48. Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 42, at 569.
49. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in
Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 785, 787-91 (2007).
50. Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 42, at 569 (stating how universalism will
"disempower local courts").
51. There is a contrary, skeptical view as to whether Chapter 15 actually delivers its
supposed benefits. This view is discussed in the author's prior articles on Chapter 15. See John
J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Lesson from
Maritime Law, 17 DuKE J. Comp. & INT'L L. 253 (2007); Chung, supra note 1.
52. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that the
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international cooperation and coordination will be seen in the gathering of
creditors from all over the world in one courtroom.
53
However, even if one accepts the need for and benefit of the universalist
approach, Chapter 15 and the Model Law are surprisingly ineffective in dealing
with conditions created by economic crisis. This ineffectiveness is because
Chapter 15 implicitly assumes two conditions regarding the foreign exchange
markets, and if either of the two assumptions is missing, Chapter 15 become
unworkable. The proponents of the Model Law have missed the fact that
creditors from different countries do not share a common currency. Many
(perhaps most) of the creditors in a Model Law proceeding will not be paid a
distribution in their own currency. Does this matter? Will creditors happily
accept any kind of paper for their claims? Any attempt to argue that money is
money, no matter what, is based on mistaken assumptions regarding the nature
and value of money. Thus, these assumptions challenge the feasibility of the
Model Law and Chapter 15.
A. Chapter 15's First Assumption Regarding Foreign Exchange
The first implicit assumption is that the currency of the home country
proceeding must be convertible. 54 In other words, if an American creditor is
forced to pursue its claims in a foreign court, the local currency of that court
must be convertible into U.S. dollars. After all, a currency distribution that has
no value outside of the home country is practically worthless to a foreign
creditor.
55
This situation may be illustrated by examining the hypothetical country of
Transitiona, a country with an emerging (but not fully developed) economy that
has spawned several multinational businesses. Transitiona has adopted the56...
Model Law. One of its corporations does business in the United States, where
it has secured and unsecured creditors. This corporation encounters financial
difficulties and files an insolvency proceeding in Transitiona, its home country.
It then applies in a U.S. bankruptcy court for recognition of the Transitiona
proceeding as the foreign main proceeding. The judge, who just returned from
a conference where the speakers uniformly extolled the virtues of universalism,
grants the application and orders all creditors to pursue their claims in
Transitiona. Having no choice, the American creditors file their claims in
Transitiona and ultimately receive a distribution from the debtor's liquidation.
conceptual benefits of universalism are efficiency, equality, and avoidance of duplicative
proceedings).
53. See id. at 40.
54. See INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/convertibility.asp (last
visited Nov. 3, 2008). Convertibility is the "ease with which a country's currency can be
converted into gold or another currency." Id.
55. Id.
56. See MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
2007).
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Suppose further that the liquidation was unusually successful and that all
creditors received 100% of their claimed amounts. There is a problem,
however. The creditors are paid in Transitiona's currency, which is not
convertible. In other words, the currency cannot be exchanged for U.S. dollars.
The creditors would certainly object because the currency would not have
value to them. Would the universalists argue that this result is fair because the
currency has value in Transitiona? In all likelihood, a U.S. court would not
force American creditors to pursue their claims in another country if the
currency of that country were not convertible into U.S. dollars.
Although this hypothetical may seem extreme, it is presented to expose one
of the assumptions on which the Model Law is based. At a minimum, the
feasibility of the Model Law depends on the convertibility of the debtor's home
currency to the creditors' home currencies. Fortunately, an American creditor
facing the possibility of being forced into a proceeding in a country without a
convertible currency would be protected by (among other provisions) §§
1507(b) and 1522(a), which expressly require the court to protect the interests
of creditors.
57
If the universalists concede this as an implicit assumption, they will quickly
point out that the assumption is not material because of the unlikelihood of a
case involving a multinational debtor whose local currency is not convertible.
As a general rule, countries without convertible currencies have weak,
dysfunctional economies that are isolated from market forces.58 It may be
unlikely that such an economy would produce a company capable of doing
business around the world. Whether or not this factual view is correct is a
matter for empirical verification. Nonetheless, most would probably agree that
the convertibility of the home country's currency is a necessary condition for
the operation of Chapter 15 and the Model Law. As unlikely as it may be for a
Chapter 15 proceeding to be commenced by a corporation whose home country
57. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1507(b), 1522(a) (2006). Section 1507(b) provides, in pertinent
part:
In determining whether to provide additional assistance under this title or under other laws
of the United States, the court shall consider whether such additional assistance, consistent
with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure-(1) just treatment of all holders of
claims against or interests in the debtor's property; (2) protection of claim holders in the
United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such
foreign proceeding; ....
Id. Section 1522(a) provides:
The court may grant relief under section 1519 or 1521, or may modify or terminate relief
under subsection (c), only if the interests of the creditors and other interested entities,
including the debtor, are sufficiently protected.
Id. Although the issue does not appear to have been addressed by a court, it seems obvious that
a court would protect a local creditor and not force it into a proceeding where the distribution
will be in a non-convertible currency. See id. §§ 1507(a)-(b), 1522(a).
58. See Jacob A. Frenkel, Commentary: Currency Convertibility in Eastern Europe, in
CENTRAL BANKING ISSUES IN EMERGING MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIES (1990),
www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/sympos/1990/S90FRENK.pdf.
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does not have a convertible currency, the preceding hypothetical highlights the
existence and importance of foreign exchange issues.
B. Chapter 15 's Second Implicit Assumption Regarding Foreign Exchange
The second implicit assumption of Chapter 15 is more likely and presents a
greater challenge to the workability of the law. Chapter 15 necessarily assumes
that foreign exchange rates are stable over time. If currency fluctuations are
significant or extreme, it becomes an open question whether Chapter 15
provides fair treatment of similarly situated creditors. The problem posed by
currency fluctuations can be demonstrated by three hypothetical scenarios, all
based on actual events. The first two involve the bankruptcy filing of Debtor,
Inc., an American business with operations in the United States and Canada.
The third involves Debtor AG, a business which has its center of its main
interests in the fictional country of Weimar.
1. Hypothetical One
Hypothetical One is based on the state of law before Chapter 15 became
effective. 59 It is based on the territorial approach to bankruptcy law. Debtor,
Inc. has its center of its main interests in Buffalo, New York, which is the site
of its headquarters and a widget-making factory. It leases a warehouse in
Toronto where it stores a supply of widgets. It distributes its widgets in Canada
by hiring independent, local delivery companies. Because its widgets are
shipped out as soon as they arrive in the Canadian warehouse, it has no
significant assets in Canada, except for a local bank account with an average
daily balance of 1,000,000 Canadian dollars.
Suppose Debtor, Inc. has 5,000,000 Canadian dollars of unsecured claims
against it held by the Canadian delivery companies, and further suppose that the
Canadian bank account is available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.
Suppose that all of Debtor, Inc.'s assets in the United States are fully
encumbered by secured claims, with the sole exception of a bank account
holding 1,000,000 U.S. dollars. Suppose further that Debtor, Inc. has 5,000,000
U.S. dollars of unsecured claims against it held by American delivery
companies.
Suppose the insolvency of Debtor, Inc. results in two separate bankruptcy
filings filed on the same day-one in the United States and one in Canada.
Each court operates independently of the other and exercises jurisdiction over
the assets within its national borders. The Canadian court would exercise
jurisdiction over the Canadian bank account and distribute the 1,000,000
Canadian dollars to the Canadian unsecured creditors. The result would be a
recovery of 20% on the unsecured claims in Canada. The American court
59. See infra note 125 (describing 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), the law prior to the time
Chapter 15 took effect).
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would exercise jurisdiction over the American bank account and distribute the
1,000,000 U.S. dollars to the American unsecured creditors. The result would
be a recovery of 20% to the unsecured claims in the United States. This
hypothetical demonstrates that there is no foreign exchange loss for the
creditors because their claims are addressed within their respective national
borders.
2. Hypothetical Two
To illustrate the currency problem, Hypothetical Two is based on a scenario
where the Model Law was in effect in both the United States and Canada on
June 30, 2004. Hypothetical Two is based on the same facts as Hypothetical
One, except for the following differences. Suppose again that the insolvency of
Debtor, Inc. results in two separate bankruptcy filings on June 30, 2004, one in
the United States and one in Canada. Under the Model Law, the U.S.
bankruptcy trustee applies to the Canadian court for recognition of the U.S.
proceeding as a foreign main roceeding because New York is the center of
Debtor, Inc.'s main interests. The Canadian court grants the application and
defers to the jurisdiction of the U.S. proceeding. Debtor, Inc. then immediately
transfers the money from the Canadian bank account to its U.S. bank account.6
On June 30, 2004, one Canadian dollar was equal to .75 U.S. dollars.62
Therefore, the American bankruptcy estate is increased by 750,000 U.S. dollars
(.75 x 1,000,000 Canadian dollars), with 1,750,000 U.S. dollars available for
distribution to unsecured creditors. The American unsecured creditors file their
proofs of claim, which total 5,000,000 U.S. dollars. The Canadian unsecured
creditors file their proofs of claim, which total 5,000,000 Canadian dollars. And
these filings are the start of the problem.
The Canadian claims are converted to U.S. dollars as of the petition date,
so 5,000,000 Canadian dollars of unsecured claims are allowed in the amount
of 3,750,000 U.S. dollars. The estate would therefore hold 1,750,000 U.S.
dollars available for distribution to holders of 8,750,000 U.S. dollars in
unsecured claims, which equals a recovery of 20% for each unsecured creditor.
There would be no problem if the distribution to the unsecured creditors
occurred on the same date as the petition date because the Canadians would be
able to immediately reconvert their 750,000 U.S. dollars (20% x 3,750,000
60. See MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
2007).
61. The transfer of assets back to the home country of the debtor would not be
unexpected. See Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. U.S. Lines Inc., [ 1989] Q.B. 360. In Felixstowe,
an American debtor attempted to transfer assets out of England and back to the United States
where it was the debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 360. The English court
enjoined the transfer, noting that the U.K. creditors would "suffer very substantial prejudice."
Id. at 389.
62. See Bank of Canada, 10-Year Currency Converter, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/
rates/exchform.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
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U.S. dollars) back to 1,000,000 Canadian dollars (20% x 5,000,000 Canadian
dollars). However, distributions are not made on the petition date.63
Suppose Debtor, Inc. is involved in a complicated Chapter 11 proceeding,
and further suppose a plan of reorganization is confirmed with an effective date
of September 28, 2007. Suppose further that the plan provides for a distribution
of 20% to all unsecured creditors as of the effective date. That provision would
mean that the Canadian claimants receive their 750,000 U.S. dollars on
September 28, 2007. Suppose then that the Canadian claimants reconvert their
U.S. dollars back to Canadian dollars. On that day, one U.S. dollar was worth
one Canadian dollar.64 Thus, the Canadian claims would receive 750,000
Canadian dollars in exchange for the distribution of 750,000 U.S. dollars.
Compare the difference in the amounts. As of the petition date (June 30,
2004), the 20% recovery against the amount of the Canadian unsecured claims
in U.S. dollars ($750,000) was equal to 1,000,000 Canadian dollars. As of the
distribution date (September 28, 2007), the 20% recovery on the amount of the
Canadian unsecured claims in U.S. dollars ($750,000) was equal to 750,000
Canadian dollars. The time lag between the petition date and the distribution
date results in a diminution of the distribution to the Canadian claimants by
250,000 Canadian dollars, or a loss of 25%. In terms of the percentage of
recovery, as of the petition date, the Canadian claimants are looking at a 20%
recovery (1,000,000 Canadian dollars / 5,000,000 Canadian dollars). As of the
distribution date, however, the Canadian claimants actually receive only a 15%
recovery. At the same time, the American unsecured claimants receive a 20%
recovery.
The glaring unfairness with this result is that the Canadians have been
prejudiced solely because they are Canadian and transact in Canadian dollars.
Even though there is no intent to discriminate against foreign creditors, it is
unavoidable that foreigners will be prejudiced simply because they are
foreigners. This prejudice obviously runs counter to notions of fairness and the
spirit of international cooperation underlying the Model Law.
65
3. The Legal Certainty of Hypothetical Two
For those unfamiliar with bankruptcy law, the question may arise whether
the law actually works in the way described in Hypothetical Two. The answer is
yes. Creditors will be ordered to pursue their claims in a foreign court if the
foreign proceeding is recognized as a foreign main proceeding, and as a general
63. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726 (stating the requirements for the distribution of a
bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
64. See Bank of Canada, 10-Year Currency Converter, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/
rates/exchform.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
65. See MODEL LAw ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY pmbl.(c) (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade Law 2007) (stating that an objective of the Model Law is to provide "[flair and efficient
administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors and other
interested persons").
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matter the amount of their claims will be set as of the commencement of the
case.
With regard to the first point, the entire purpose of the Model Law and
Chapter 15 is to give deference to one court in one country.67 One court will be
recognized as the foreign main proceeding, and all courts in other countries that
follow the Model Law are required to defer to that proceeding. 68 Creditors are
thus forced into the court system of a foreign country, whether they wish to
have their claims resolved there or not.
This result has already occurred under Chapter 15. In In re Ephedra
Products Liability Litigation,69 a group of American tort claimants filed
personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits in the United States against a
company called Muscletech Research and Development, Inc. ("Muscletech"). 70
Muscletech commenced an insolvency proceeding in Canada, and pursuant to
Chapter 15, petitioned a U.S. court for recognition of the Canadian proceeding
as the foreign main proceeding. 71 The U.S. court granted recognition. 72 The
Canadian proceeding established a procedure to resolve the tort claims, but the
American tort claimants objected to the procedure and asked the U.S. court to
refuse to recognize and enforce the Canadian procedure. 73 The U.S. district
court denied the claimants' request and enforced the application of the
Canadian proceeding.
74
In re Ephedra Products illustrates the beauty (or nightmare, depending on
one's perspective) of Chapter 15. Under the Model Law and Chapter 15, a local
creditor may be forced to pursue its claims in a foreign proceeding, whether it
wishes to or not. This requirement is the result even if the local creditor never
leaves its own country and enters into a contract or transaction governed by its
local law.
With regard to the second point, the amount of an uncontested,
liquidated claim is determined as of the filing date of the petition.75 In other
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2006) (stating that the court shall determine the amount of
the claim as of the date of the filing of the petition).
67. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1509-24 (stating how foreign creditors are given access to courts,
the steps to recognizing a foreign proceeding, and how relief is obtained); MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY pt. 1, ch.3, arts. 15-24 (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law 2007).
68. See generally Chung, supra note 1, at 97-98 (describing a Chapter 15 proceeding).
69. 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
70. Id. at 334.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 337.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2006); In re Cardelucci, 285 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.
2002).
Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, creditors with a claim against the estate must
pursue their rights to the claim in federal court and entitlement to a claim is a matter of
federal law.... Absent a timely objection, all claims filed against the bankrupt estate are
'deemed allowed' as of the date of filing. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). This allowed claim, like a
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words, the holder of an uncontested, liquidated claim will not have the amount
of its claim determined as of a later date, such as the date the money is actually
distributed; the filing date is the controlling date. 76 Furthermore, all claimants
in a U.S. bankruptcy court (whether American or foreign) shall have their
claims determined in U.S. dollars.77 Read together, Chapter 15 and the other
judgment, gives the creditor a legal "right to payment" of a specific sum of money against
the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5); 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). As of the date of the filing of the
petition, creditors hold a claim, similar to a federal judgment, against the estate, the
payment of which is only dependent upon completion of the bankruptcy process.
Id. The importance of the filing date of the petition for purposes of determining the amount of a
claim is also seen in § 502(b), which states in pertinent part that "if such objection to a claim is
made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful
currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such
claim in such amount...." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
A 'creditor or indenture trustee' seeking to make a claim on a bankruptcy estate is
instructed to file a proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501. All claims are
presumptively 'allowed' in full unless another party in interest in the proceedings files an
objection. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). If such an objection is made, as here, the Bankruptcy Court
holds a hearing and reduces the allowable amount of the claim pursuant to the remainder of
§ 502.
In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 449 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2006).
76. The need to fix the amount of claims as of a single date is also seen in the bankruptcy
laws of countries around the world. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 342 (1992).
Valuing the Canadian claims at a later date (such as the distribution date) would create a
different but similar problem. Such a move would increase the U.S. dollar distribution to the
Canadian creditors, but that would necessarily mean fewer U.S. dollars to distribute to the
American creditors. As a result, they would certainly object.
77. In re Good Hope Chemical Corp., 747 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Frontera
Transp. Corp. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199 (5th Cir. 1921)) (stating that the date of determination for
the applicable exchange rate is a "harder question"). An American federal court must render
judgment in U.S. dollars. See Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich.
1985) ("Both parties agree, and the law is settled, that a United States District Court can award
judgment only in dollars."). The requirement of expressing claims in U.S. dollars is also seen in
§ 502(b), which provides that if an objection is made to a claim, the court "shall determine the
amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the
petition." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit, however, disagrees:
Foreign currency awards are rare in federal courts of the United States-this may be the
first-because § 20 of the Coinage Act of 1792, 31 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), provided that
'[t]he money of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars.. . and all
proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation.' Congress
repealed this section of the Coinage Act in 1982.... There is now no bar to judgment in
the appropriate currency.
In the Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954
F.2d 1279, 1328 (7th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit appears to agree with the Seventh Circuit.
See Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2002).
The repeal of§ 20 of the Coinage Act and the ruling in In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz
have created some uncertainty as to whether a federal court may award judgments in foreign
currencies. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328; Reliastar, 303 F.3d at
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applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code require that the hypothetical
Canadian claimants have their claims fixed as of the filing date of Debtor, Inc's
petition and have their distribution in U.S. dollars. What started out as a local
transaction and a local debt in Canadian dollars has turned into a different kind
of claim--one to be paid in a foreign currency. 78 The Canadian claimants'
882. This uncertainty is reflected in two decisions from the Southern District Court of New
York. One district judge ruled that the court had such power. See Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v.
Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Another judge ruled that the court did
not. See Sae Sadelmi S.P.A. v. Papua New Guinea Elec. Comm'n, No. 94 Civ. 2959 (SS), 1994
WL 669543, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1994) ("An American court, however, can only enter a
money judgment in U.S. dollars.").
78. The situation with these hypothetical Canadian claimants should be contrasted to a
situation where a local creditor voluntarily becomes a creditor on a claim that is intended from
the outset to be paid in a foreign currency. In such a situation, the creditor bears the risk of
currency fluctuation. See Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926); see also
Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1927). The Deutsche Bank Court stated:
An obligation in terms of the currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations
and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes no account of it....
Obviously in fact a dollar or a mark may have different values at different times but to the
law that establishes it is always the same.
Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. at 519.
Some supporters of universalism may argue that a creditor ought to bear foreign currency
risk any time it transacts with a foreign corporation. To advance this view, the supporters would
likely quote the following: "Such being the law, it follows that every person who deals with a
foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government, affecting
the powers and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known
and established policy of that government authorizes." Canada So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S.
527, 537 (1883). The dispute in Canada Southern arose when holders of bonds issued by the
railroad company objected to the treatment of their bonds after the company ran into financial
trouble. Id. at 528. The quoted passage is undoubtedly broad. However, the true breadth of its
meaning can only be determined with reference to the facts of the case. These facts suggest a
much narrower reach:
The obligor of the bonds and coupons here sued on was a corporation created for a public
purpose, that is to say, to build, maintain, and work a railway in Canada. It had its
corporate home in Canada, and was subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the
Dominion parliament. It had no power to borrow money or incur debts except for
completing, maintaining, and working its railway. The bonds taken by the defendants in
error showed on their face that they were part of a series amounting in the aggregate to a
very large sum of money, and that they were secured by a trust mortgage on the railway of
the company, its lands, tolls, revenues, etc. In this way the defendants in error, when they
bought their bonds, were, in legal effect, informed that they were entering into contract
relations not only with a foreign corporation created for a public purpose, and carrying on
its business within a foreign jurisdiction, but with the holders of other bonds of the same
series, who were relying equally with themselves for their ultimate security on a mortgage
of property devoted to a public use, situated entirely within the territory of a foreign
government.
Id. at 536-37. From these facts, it is clear that the creditors' claims were tied to Canada in a way
that is materially different from an everyday situation where a foreign business enters the
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exposure to the foreign exchange risk is involuntary and unavoidable as a
matter of law.
79
4. Hypothetical Three
Hypothetical Three concerns a debtor called Debtor AG. Debtor AG has its
center of its main interests in the country of Weimar, which is the site of its
headquarters and widget-making factory. Weimar, like the United States, has
enacted the Model Law into its bankruptcy law. Debtor AG leases a
warehouse in New England where it stores an inventory of widgets. It
distributes its widgets in the United States by hiring independent, local delivery
companies. Because its widgets are shipped out as soon as they arrive in the
American warehouse, it has no significant assets in the United States except for
a local bank account with a balance of $1,000,000.
Suppose Debtor AG has $5,000,000 of unsecured claims against it held by
the American delivery companies, and further suppose that the U.S. bank
account is available for distribution to the unsecured creditors. Suppose that all
of Debtor AG's assets in Weimar are fully encumbered by secured claims, with
the sole exception of a bank account holding 50,000,000 Weimar marks.
Suppose further that Debtor AG has 250,000,000 Weimar marks of unsecured
claims against it held by Weimar delivery companies.
Suppose that Debtor AG becomes insolvent and files two separate
bankruptcy filings on December 1, 2009, one in Weimar and the other in the
United States. Pursuant to the Model Law, the Weimar bankruptcy trustee
applies to the U.S. court for recognition of the Weimar proceeding as a foreign
main proceeding. 81 The U.S. court grants the application and defers to the
jurisdiction of the Weimar proceeding. Debtor AG then immediately transfers
the money from its U.S. bank account to its Weimar bank account. On
December 1, 2009, 50 Weimar marks are equal to one dollar. As a result, the
Weimar bankruptcy estate is increased by 50,000,000 marks and there are
100,000,000 marks available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
The Weimar unsecured creditors file their proofs of claim, which total
250,000,000 Weimar marks. The American unsecured creditors file their proofs
of claim, and their claims are converted to Weimar marks as of the petition
date. As a result, $5,000,000 of unsecured claims are allowed in the amount of
250,000,000 Weimar marks. The estate would therefore hold 100,000,000
domestic market to conduct its business.
79. This Article will later examine whether the risk may be avoided as a matter of fact. See
infra Parts V and VI.
80. See MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
2007).
81. See id. pt. 1, ch.III, arts. 15-17. Article 15 of the Model Law states the requirements for
recognition of a foreign proceeding. Id. pt. 1, ch.III, art. 15. Article 16 gives the presumptions
concerning recognition of a foreign proceeding. Id. pt. 1, ch.III, art. 16. Article 17 outlines the
"[d]ecision to recognize a foreign proceeding." Id. pt. 1, ch.III, art. 17.
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Weimar marks available for distribution to holders of 500,000,000 Weimar
marks in unsecured claims, which equals a recovery of 20% for each unsecured
creditor. There would be no problem if the distribution to the unsecured
creditors occurred on the same date as the petition date because the American
creditors would be able to immediately reconvert their 50,000,000 Weimar
marks (20% x 250,000,000) back to $1,000,000. However, distributions are not
made on the petition date.
Suppose Debtor AG has its Weimar equivalent of a plan of reorganization
confirmed with an effective date of November 1,2013. Suppose further that the
plan provides for a distribution of 20% to all unsecured creditors as of the
effective date. This provision would mean that the American claimants receive
their 50,000,000 Weimar marks on November 1, 2013. Suppose then that the
American claimants reconvert their Weimar marks back to U.S. dollars.
Suppose, however, Weimar has since experienced economic collapse and
currency devaluation. The extent of the devaluation is so severe that as of
November 2013, one dollar is worth one trillion Weimar marks. Thus, the
American claimants would receive several orders of magnitude less than one
penny in U.S. currency in exchange for the distribution of 50,000,000 Weimar
marks.
Compare the staggering difference in the amounts. As of the petition date,
the 20% recovery on the amount of the American unsecured claims in Weimar
marks would be equal to $1,000,000. As of the distribution date, the 20%
recovery on the amount of the American unsecured claims in Weimar marks is
less than a penny. The time lag between the petition date and the distribution
date results in a total loss for the American claimants.
5. The Factual Certainty of Hypothetical Three
The facts of Hypothetical Three are indisputably extreme, so extreme that a
reader may wonder if it could actually happen. The answer is yes; it could
happen. In fact, it has happened, and the occurrence of such extreme currency
crises is actually a regular and frequent occurrence in historical terms.
83
Hypothetical Three is based on the Weimar hyperinflation in post-World
War I Germany.84 As extreme as it was, the magnitude of the Weimar
82. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1123 (2006).
83. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (describing currency crises in Germany,
Hungary, and Yugoslavia).
84. These dates and numbers are based on the actual rates of the Weimar hyperinflation
between 1919 and 1923. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW: A COMPARATvE STUDY
IN THE BORDERLINE OF LAW AND EcoNoMIcs (1950).
In June, 1918, the dollar (parity 4.21 marks) had reached a level of 5.31 and byNovember,
1918, 7.43. In December 1919, the dollar was quoted at 46.77; in December, 1920, at 73;
in December, 192 1, at 191; in July 1922, at 493; in October, 1922, at 3180; in December,
1922, at 7589.... [D]ollar quotations in January, 1923, averaged 17,972; in February,
27,918; in March, 21,190; in April, 24,457; in May, 47,670; in June, 109,996; in July
[Vol. 76:67
CHAPTER 15
hyperinflation is neither uncommon nor the relic of a bygone age. This type of
economic collapse occurred numerous times in the twentieth century and even
within the lifetime of today's law students.8 5 It is just that most Americans are
unaware of such events because of the comparative shelter provided by the U.S.
dollar, which enjoys the status of the world's most accepted currency. 86 For
example, the peak monthly inflation rate of the Weimar era was 32,400%, but
Hungary experienced a monthly inflation rate in July 1946 that was twelve
orders of magnitude greater than the highest Weimar rate.87 More recently,
Yugoslavia's monthly inflation rate in January 1994 was 313,000,000%, or
four orders of magnitude higher than Weimar's highest rate.88
A reader may wonder about the use of such extreme economic horror
stories to punctuate a point, and detractors may argue that such rare events say
nothing about Chapter 15's viability. However, many would probably agree
that an event is not rare if it occurs three times in one century in advanced
European countries, with the most recent occurrence in the last decade. 89 More
importantly, these are just the most extreme examples. Hyperinflation and
currency collapse on a Weimar scale may not occur every decade, but
hyperinflation and currency collapse on a lesser scale do. The following are a
few modem examples.
a. Argentina
In January 2002, Argentina devalued its peso, abandoning its policy of
maintaining the value of one peso to one U.S. dollar.90 On January 29, 2002,
353,412. Then the dollar quotations soared to astronomical heights: 4.6 millions in August;
150 millions on September 18; 1.2 billion on October 9; 12 billions on October 19; the
trillion limit was attained on November 14.
Id. at 200.
It is possible to argue that interest rates on bank deposits would also have been rising along
with hyperinflation, making more money available to distribute to unsecured creditors in
Hypothetical 3. It is unlikely, however, that bank deposit rates would match the hyperinflation.
Also, hyperinflation would likely trigger currency controls and render the fictional marks
unconvertible.
85. See Steve H. Hanke, The World's Greatest UnreportedHyperinflation, GLOBE ASIA,
May 2007, at 108. Professor Hanke is a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins
University. Id.
86. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES &
FUNCTIONS 51 (9th ed. 2005).
87. Hanke, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. As of early 2008, hyperinflation was already taking place in the world. See Zimbabwe
Bank Issues $10 Million Bill - But It Won't Even Buy You a Hamburger in Harare, DAILY MAIL,
Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-508840/Zimbabwe-bank-issues-
1 Omillion--wont-buy-hamburger-Harave.html. Zimbabwe is experiencing hyperinflation at an
annual rate estimated between 25,000% and 150,000%. Id.
90. See Jim Lehrer, Falling Peso, ONLINE NEWSHOUR, Jan. 7, 2002,
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one U.S. dollar was equal to 1.78 Argentine iesos.91 On June 28, 2002, one
U.S. dollar was equal to 3.85 Argentine pesos.92 In other words, the Argentine
peso lost more than half of its value against the U.S. dollar in less than five
months.
b. Russia
On August 13, 1998, the Russian stock, bond, and currency markets
collapsed. 97A few days later, the Russian government devalued the ruble.
94
The effect was seen in the dramatic drop of the ruble against the U.S. dollar. In
June 1998, approximately five rubles were equal to one U.S. dollar, butb
September 1999, it required approximately 30 rubles to equal one U.S. dollar."3
c. Thailand
In July 1997, Thailand was forced to devalue its currency, the Thai baht.
9 6
On June 30, 1997, one U.S. dollar was equal to 24.70 Thai baht.97 By January
30, 1998, one U.S. dollar was equal to 52.85 Thai baht.98 In seven months, theThai baht lost more than half of its value against the U.S. dollar.
d Mexico
.... 99
Mexico also suffered a currency crisis in the 1990s. On December 20,
1994, Mexico devalued its peso. 10°° On December 19, 1994, one U.S. dollar
was equal to 3.45 Mexican pesos. 101 One year later on December 19, 1995, one
U.S. dollar was equal to 7.67 Mexican pesos. 1 2 In one year, the Mexican peso
lost more than half of its value against the U.S. dollar.
The lesson from these recent events is that Chapter 15's assumption
regarding stable exchange rates is easily and frequently disturbed. Indeed,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin-america/jan-june02/argentina_1 -07.html.
91. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at C9.
92. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jul. 1, 2002, at C 10.
93. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of a Currency Crisis: The
Russian Default of 1998, 84 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REv. 7 (2002), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/02/1 1/ChiodoOwyang.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 11 fig.3.
96. See Thailand: The Crisis Starts, BBC NEWS, Nov. 26, 1997,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/specialreport/1997/asianeconomicwoes/34487.stm.
97. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jul. 1, 1997, at C18.
98. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at C27.
99. See Joseph A. Whitt, Jr., The Mexican Peso Crisis, EcON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 1,
www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/Jwhi811 .pdf.
100. Id.
101. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1994, at C1 6.
102. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995, at C17.
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stability may be the exception and not the norm. To the extent a reader is not
familiar with these relatively recent events in Argentina, Russia, Thailand, and
Mexico, it is because he or she has been cocooned by exclusive transactions in
U.S. dollars. However, that protection will disappear as a matter of law by
operation of Chapter 15.
Contemporary economic conditions further demonstrate this problem. Euro
banknotes and coins were first introduced into circulation on January 1,
2002.103 At that time, one euro was worth 0.90 U.S. dollars. °4 By the
beginnin of January 2008, the value of one euro had risen to 1.47 U.S.
dollars. This change in value was the result of cyclical, long-term forces-
the ordinary functioning of national economies. Thus, dramatic movements in
the foreign exchange market happen over time, even in the absence of
cataclysmic shocks.
The universalists may argue that the rise and fall of currency values make
no difference and that Chapter 15 and the Model Law are unaffected.
Currencies go up and down in value, and that fluctuation is just a fact of life.
However, bankruptcy law, to a large extent, is about the treatment of
creditors.1 06 Can Chapter 15 work if foreign creditors are paid in pieces of
paper that have fallen significantly in value against their local currencies? The
universalists may not particularly care about this question, but the creditors
certainly will. Creditors who find themselves in this situation will likely have
their concerns dismissed by those who believe that supposed global efficiencies
outweigh creditor concerns. However, the creditors' objection to such treatment
may find support in Chapter 15's public policy exception. 10
7
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE RAISED BY FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FLUCTUATIONS
Chapter 15 applies unless its application would violate public policy.10 8
Section 1506 of Chapter 15 provides in its entirety: "Nothing in this chapter
prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if
the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States."' 109 Would the creditors in Hypotheticals Two and Three be able toinvoke this public policy exception? Would it violate a country's public policy
103. See National Bank of Belgium, A Brief History of the Euro,
http://www.nbb.be/pub/Home.htm?l=en (follow "Notes and coins" hyperlink; then follow "A
brief history of the euro" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
104. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2002, at C16.
105. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2008, at C12.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(3) (2006) (stating that one objective of Chapter 15 is to
"[p]rotect the interests of all creditors").
107. See id. § 1506.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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to force its local creditors into a foreign proceeding where their recovery will be
materially diminished due to foreign exchange fluctuations?
The answer (like the answer to most legal questions) is that it depends. The
easy case may be presented in a Weimar-like situation. Although this author has
not located a reported bankruptcy case that directly addresses this issue, the
Second Circuit has expressly acknowledged that forcing a party into a foreign
forum where its claim might become worthless due to currency fluctuations
might violate American public policy.I10 In Finanz A G, the plaintiff sought to
recover on certain promissory notes allegedly guaranteed by the defendant. III
The plaintiff filed a state court action, which was removed to federal court.
112
At the time of the American litigation, the defendant was subject to an
extrajudicial liquidation proceeding in Brazil."l 3 The district court granted the
defendant motion's to dismiss the federal court action in favor of the Brazilian
proceeding.114
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it would violate American public policy
to force it into the Brazilian proceeding because of the loss it would suffer due
to the conversion of its claim from U.S. dollars to Brazilian reals. 1 5 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument, but at the same time recognized its
potential merit. 116 The court stated:
It may well be that this practice places the risk of currency fluctuation on
Finanz. Nonetheless, the United States applies a similar practice in its
bankruptcy proceedings, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (providing that, as a general
matter, "the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of
such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date ofthefiling
of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount" (emphasis
added)), and it is not surprising that Brazil would utilize such a procedure to
promote the orderly liquidation of claims. Of course, if the early conversion
of a creditor's claims into foreign currency would render a debt
unenforceable or valueless, we might have cause to conclude that a
conversion procedure was fundamentally unfair. However, Finanz does not
make this complaint, and that situation is not before us. Accordingly, we
agree with the District CPurt that the conversion procedure in this case is not
fundamentally unfair.I
Even though the court's observation is clearly dictum, it does acknowledge
the reality that foreign exchange fluctuations may reach a point where it would
violate public policy to force a creditor into a foreign proceeding where it must
110. See Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240,250 (2d Cir. 1999).
111. Id. at244.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 243.
114. Id. at 244.
115. Id. at250.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
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suffer material losses. 118 The court's language also suggests that a Weimar-type
situation would trigger the public policy exception and that a U.S. court should
protect American creditors from such a situation.
119
The difficult question, of course, is how much harm to local creditors will
be tolerated before the public policy exception will apply. Would Hypothetical
Two's 25% diminution in recovery trigger the exception? 20 Although there
appear to be no cases that directly address this issue, analogous case law
suggests some likely parameters.
In re Hwang 12 involved a Korean company, Onse Telecom ("Onse"),
which was in reorganization under Korean law. 122 While the Korean
proceeding was pending, Onse was also a defendant in an American lawsuit
brought by Oxyn Telecommunications, Inc. ("Oxyn").123 Oxyn sought more
than $100 million from Onse. 124 Onse's receiver made a motion in the U.S.
bankruptcy court (under the now-repealed 11 U.S.C. § 304) seeking a
permanent injunction to prohibit suits or enforcement of judgments against
Onse in the United States. Oxyn objected to the motion on the ground that it
would suffer an economic hardship if required to pursue its claims in Korea.126
One of Oxyn's arguments was that it would be reguired to pay a stamp duty of
$133,000 if forced to litigate its claims in Korea. The U.S. bankruptcy court
described this argument as "disingenuous" in light of the fact that Oxyn had
already spent more than $1.8 million in attorneys' fees and expected to spend
over $2.6 million more. The court granted the foreign representative's
motion and enjoined the American litigation against Onse.729
One way to look at Oxyn's argument is that Oxyn faced a diminution of
approximately 0.13% in its potential recovery as a result of being forced into a
foreign forum ($133,000 / $100,000,000). Finanz AG suggests that a near
118. Id. at250.
119. See id.; supra Part II.B.4.
120. See supra Part II.B.2.
121. 309 B.R. 842 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
122. Id. at 843.
123. Id. at 843-44.
124. Id. at 844.
125. Id. at 844-45. Prior to Chapter 15, the Bankruptcy Code addressed transnational
bankruptcies in a single Code section, 11 U.S.C. § 304, which was repealed and replaced by
Chapter 15. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of Apr. 20,2005, Pub. L. 109-8, title VIII, § 802(dX3), 119 Stat. 146.
Section 304 permitted foreign representatives in insolvency proceedings to file motions in U.S.
bankruptcy court to protect the administration of the foreign proceeding. Id. One prominent
commentator has stated that the case law under repealed § 304 applies to Chapter 15, except
where it limits the relief available. See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 720.
126. In reHwang, 309 B.R. at 846-47.
127. Id. at 847.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 847-48.
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100% diminution in value triggers the public policy exception, 1" ° while In re
Hwang suggests that a 0.13% diminution does not. I This range, of course, is
not much help in evaluating whether the creditors in Hypothetical Two fall
under the protection of the public policy exception. Nonetheless, this analysis is
helpful to the extent that it shows that limits do exist in terms of how much
harm to a creditor will be tolerated and to the extent that it demonstrates that a
range exists in the first place (even if the range is too wide to be helpful).
A public policy challenge will most likely be difficult to establish. In.
determining whether a foreign proceeding violates American public policy,
U.S. bankruptcy law does not require that a distribution in a foreign proceeding
be the same as the distribution in a hypothetical U.S. case or that American
creditors receive the same treatment they would be entitled to under U.S.
law. 132 The ke 3y issue is whether "fundamental standards of procedural fairness
are observed." Many, if not most, successful public policy challenges have
been based on a lack of adequate notice in a foreign proceeding. 1
34
Based on these principles, universalists would certainly argue that the
problem of foreign exchange rates is a non-issue and does not even merit
attention from the courts as a matter of law. They might concede that a dramatic
hyper-inflationary event triggers a public policy issue, but they are not likely to
concede the existence of any issue for a situation short of that. The present state
of the case law may support that view, but should it? Most, if not all, creditors
would probably agree that it makes a material impact if they receive 25% less in
a foreign proceeding due to foreign currency fluctuations. For some, it could
determine whether their business survives. The prejudice is aggravated by the
fact that the creditors have been forced involuntarily into a foreign proceeding
because of the Model Law.135 If these are the stakes involved, it seems curious
that the law would say that such circumstances do not present a legal problem.
130. See Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 1999).
131. Seeln re Hwang, 309 B.R. at 842.
132. In re Bd. of Dir. of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(stating that the cases do not require that "U.S. creditors receive the precise recovery or
treatment to which they would be entitled under Chapter 11").
133. Id. at 503.
134. Id. at 510; see, e.g., Inter. Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana,
S.A., 347 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003) (comity denied due to insufficient notice).
135. The universalists would undoubtedly challenge this assertion by arguing that creditors
(except for tort creditors) enter into transactions with foreign entities by choice and are free not
to deal with foreign entities if they are concerned with the Model Law or Chapter 15.
A preliminary response to this argument is that if a purpose of the Model Law and Chapter
15 is to ease economic transactions in a global economy, the question is raised whether business
is indeed easier for a person who has to factor in the possible application of a different foreign
law for every new business relationship. See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at
713.
But more to the point, it is a mistaken assumption that people enter into transactions with
foreign entities by informed choice. By way of illustration, one of the large grocery store chains
in New England is Stop & Shop. See Stop & Shop, Welcome to Stop & Shop,
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Even if most successful public policy objections are based on lack of
notice, the law does not state that lack of notice is the only basis for a public
policy objection. 136 The difficulty with articulating a reliable guideline is that
anything involving "public policy" is by nature fuzzy and elusive. Given the
absence of clear boundaries, it is equally legitimate to point to other policies of
bankruptcy law when raising a public policy argument.
Bankruptcy courts must be "guided by what will best assure an economical
and expeditious administration of the estate, consistent with just treatment of all
creditors and equity security holders [and by] protection of local creditors and
equity security holders against prejudice and inconvenience in processing
claims and interests in the foreign proceeding." 3 7 The guiding premise of the
Bankruptcy Code, like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act, is the equality of
distribution of assets among creditors."'' 38 It is the courts' "obligation to guard
against 'forcing American creditors to participate in foreign proceedings in
which their claims will be treated in some manner inimical to this country's
policy of equality."1
39
http://www.stopandshop.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). Where is its home country? It is
probably unlikely that anyone asks this question while shopping there, but just suppose one
wanted to know. One could go to the website, http://www.stopandshop.com, and look for an
answer. On the website, one may click on "About Us" and learn that the business was founded
in 1914 in Massachusetts and that today it is the one of the largest food retailers in New
England. See Stop & Shop, The Company, http://www.stopandshop.con/aboutus/
company/index.htm (lasted visited Nov. 7, 2008). Although the website mentions that Stop &
Shop is now owned by Ahold, it does not say where this company is located. Id From the
information listed on the website, one could reasonably conclude that U.S. law would always
apply to any transaction with Stop & Shop.
However, if one goes to the website of Ahold, http://www.ahold.com, and clicks on "About
us," one learns that Ahold's corporate center is in Amsterdam and that it owns the Stop & Shop
supermarket chain. See Ahold, About Us, http://www.ahold.com/page/3554.aspx (last visited
Nov. 7, 2008). In other words, the Stop & Shop website does not provide much information
indicating that it is part of Ahold, a Dutch company. One needs to leave the Stop & Shop
website in order to locate that important fact on the Royal Ahold website. In light of this one
example involving a business that is part of the daily lives of perhaps millions of people, one
wonders how many small creditors and counterparties of Stop & Shop know they are dealing
with a foreign entity.
136. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir.
1985) (granting comity to a Swedish bankruptcy proceeding and discussing public policy
concerns); In re Multicanal, 314 B.R. at 503 (stating that "[t]he key issue is one of due process
and the public policy of the forum").
137. CunardS.S. Co., 773 F.2d at 455 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 95-598(1978), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5968, 6281).
138. Id. at 459.
139. Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987)
(quoting Banque de Financement S.A. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911,921 (2d Cir.
1977)); see also Phila. Gear Corp. v. Phila. Gear de Mex., S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir.
1994).
2008]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Are all creditors of similar standing given just treatment when some are
involuntarily subjected to foreign currency risk and others are not? Are local
creditors protected if they are ordered to pursue their claims in a foreign court
where their claims become exposed to (and are prejudiced by) foreign currency
risk? Is it fair and just when claims are impaired solely due to the fact that the
creditor is foreign? The Bankruptcy Code incorporates "the equitable principle
that the delay in liquidation and subsequent distribution necessitated by the
bankruptc jrocess should result in neither gain nor loss for similarly situated
creditors." Does imposing foreign exchange loss on foreign creditors violate
this principle?
The thorniness of these issues is compounded by the fact that the problems
do not go away even if a court orders payments to creditors in their local
currencies. In Hypothetical Two, for example, the Canadian creditors could
be protected if they were paid in Canadian dollars.142 However, the trustee's
cost of purchasing Canadian dollars, which have appreciated while the case was
pending, with U.S. dollars necessarily means that there will be fewer U.S.
dollars to distribute to the American claimants. Thus, the protection of the
Canadian creditors harms the American creditors. Either way, a group of
national creditors is hurt, and it is due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar
against the Canadian dollar.
IV. Do FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES UNDERMINE THE
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE?
In addition to the broad public policy issues, foreign exchange fluctuations
have the potential to create an issue concerning a fundamental bedrock
principle of bankruptcy law-the "absolute priority rule." The absolute priority
140. 4 COLLER ON BANKRuprCY 502.03[3][a], at 502-26.1 (15th ed. rev. 2007).
141. The justification for such an order is arguably based on In re Oil Spill by the Amoco
Cadiz off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1328 (7th Cir. 1992). The
court observed:
Judgment in a foreign currency is especially attractive when the commercial activity took
place in that currency. Parties that conduct their dealings in francs, rubles, pesos, yuan,
bolivars, or australs either accept the risk of changes in the value of that currency or have
made provisions to hedge against that risk. Computing an award in cruzeiros and then
converting to dollars creates a risk that the parties did not accept-the risk that the judge
will select an inapt date or use a currency no one had included in hedging plans. Fights
over conversion dates are inevitable whenever judges enter dollar awards to redress
injuries denominated in other currencies. Thus the English rule should be used in the
United States too-not because the choice-of-law provision in this contract requires it, but
because it is the right rule for commerce. The court should enter the judgment in the
currency the parties themselves selected for their dealings, the currency in which the loss is
felt. All problems about conversion dates vanish, and the parties' hedging strategies (or
lack thereof) proceed unimpeded.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. See supra Part II.B.2.
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rule requires that "each member of a senior class of claims or interests must
receive full compensation before members of a junior class could receive
anything." 4 3 The effect of the rule is that, absent agreement, all creditors must
be paid in full before any equity holder receives anything in a Chapter 11
reorganization (because creditors are senior to equity holders). 144
With this in mind, a variation of Hypothetical Two raises an issue
concerning the absolute priority rule. The facts of Hypothetical Two remain the
same, 145 except for the following. Suppose Debtor, Inc.'s insolvency was
caused by the tortious conduct of a competitor and the debtor-in-possession
sues the competitor. Suppose the lawsuit is successful and the recovery permits
full payment of all creditor claims in addition to providing some compensation
for equity holders.
As of the petition date (June 30, 2004), the Canadian claimants held
5,000,000 Canadian dollars of unsecured claims, which were allowed in the
amount of 3,750,000 U.S. dollars. On the effective date of the plan (September
28, 2007), they are paid the full amount of their claims-3,750,000 U.S.
dollars. However, when they convert back to their home currency at the current
exchange rate, they only receive 3,750,000 Canadian dollars rather than the
5,000,000 Canadian dollars that was the amount of their claim. The Canadian
claimants' injury is compounded by the fact that Debtor, Inc.'s equity holders
have received something, even though the Canadian claimants have not
received a full recovery in their home currency. Is this a violation of the
absolute priority rule? It may not be if the issue is weighed purely in U.S. dollar
terms. However, it would certainly be understandable if the Canadians argued
that a violation had occurred.
Such an argument was raised in In re Garcia Avila.146 The representative
of Mexican debtors commenced an ancillary case under the repealed § 304
seeking an injunction of collection efforts in New York by a group of American
creditors.' 47 The creditors were institutional holders of bonds issued by the
143. WILLUAM D. WARREN & DANImL J. BUSSEL, BANKR PTcy 772 (7th ed. 2006). Section
11 29(b)(1) provides that a debtor may "cram down" a reorganization plan over the objection of
a creditor "if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan." 11
U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(1) (2006). "The principles underpinning Section 1 129(b)'s 'fair and equitable'
requirement are rooted in the judicially created absolute priority rule." In re Armstrong World
Ind., Inc., 320 B.R. 523, 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); see also BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD & THoMAs H. JACKSON, BANKRuFrCY 520 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the absolute priority
rule as "the bedrock of Chapter 11").
144. WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 143, at 772. "The absolute priority rule requires that
certain classes of claimants be paid in full before any member of a subordinate class is paid."In
re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1180 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002). "Under this rule, unsecured
creditors stand ahead of investors in the receiving line and their claims must be satisfied before
any investment loss is compensated." Id.
145. See supra Part II.B.2.
146. 296 B.R. 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
147. Id. at 99.
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Mexican debtors. 148 The representative also requested that the U.S. court defer
to the pending Mexican insolvency proceeding on the basis of comity. 149 The
American creditors objected to the request and argued that they should not be
forced to resolve their claims in the Mexican proceeding.' 50 They argued that
the distribution to creditors in that proceeding would violate the absolute
priority rule because they would receive less than full value on their claims
while equity holders would retain their equity interest. 151
Creditors in In re Board ofDirectors of Multicanal S.A. 52 also objected to
a foreign proceeding on the grounds of the absolute priority rule.' 53 The debtor
was an Argentinean cable company, and the objecting creditor was an
American entity formed by an institutional investment manager to hold
unsecured notes issued by the debtor. 54 The notes were held on behalf of
institutional investors, including pension funds, charitable foundations, and
universities. 155 The creditor objected to the treatment of the notes in a pending
insolvency proceeding in Argentina 156 and argued that the treatment would
violate the absolute priority rule because equity holders would retain a stake in
the debtor. 
157
In both In re Garcia Avila and In re Multicanal, the U.S. courts rejected
the absolute priority rule objections and stated that such an objection to a § 304
proceeding is not supported by the lone fact that an American unsecured
creditor may receive a smaller distribution in the foreign proceeding. 5 8 At the
same time, however, the court in In re Garcia Avila did recognize that "iif
foreign law rendered the claim worthless, comity might be inappropriate.'
This language would encompass a situation where a claim loses significant
value due to a currency crisis.
Even though the initial round of objections based on the absolute priority
rule have failed, such objections may find vitality if different kinds of
unsecured creditors are involved. Both In re Garcia Avila and In re Multicanal
involved unsecured claims held by sophisticated institutional investors. 160 Such
creditors are in a better position to understand the currency risks and are better
able to address and allocate the risk at the outset of the transaction. But what if
148. Id. at 101.
149. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 109.
151. Id. at Ill.
152. 314 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
153. Id. at 506.
154. Id. at 491.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 499.
157. Id. at 506.
158. In re Garcia Avila, 296 B.R. 95, 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Multicanal, 314
B.R. at 506.
159. In re Garcia Avila, 296 B.R. at 112 n.24 (citing Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco
Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)).
160. Id. at 10l; In re Multicanal, 314 B.R. at 496.
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the creditors are not institutional creditors? Such creditors might be in a more
sympathetic position to invoke a broader reading of the "fair and equitable rule"
under § 1129(b). 6 1 The rule may be interpreted to include the prohibition of
unfair and unreasonable shifting of the risk assumed by the creditor in its
original bargain with the debtor.162 Such creditors could argue that their
original bargain was made exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction with the
promise that they would be paid in domestic currency. Thus, any other result
would be an improper restructuring of the original bargain and its incorporated
risks.
The problem is that in a Chapter 15 case with creditors from all over the
world, the bankruptcy courts (and the universalists) may not just simply assume
that money is money. The value of the currency of payment becomes an
issue, and when value is an issue:
If a junior class receives or retains property on account of its prior claim or
interest, then the value of what the dissenting senior class receives is
important. If less tha[n] the allowed amount of the creditor' s gaim, absolute
priority is violated unless no other junior class participates.
A multinational bankruptcy raises numerous issues that are not present in a
purely domestic bankruptcy. Chapter 15 would not exist otherwise. The
introduction of new (and perhaps unanticipated) issues may require the courts
to develop a more heightened awareness of these transnational issues.
V. ARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE FLUCTUATIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM IN
BANKRUPTCY?
Skeptics may argue that any problems resulting from foreign exchange
fluctuations are exaggerated and perhaps imaginary. Currencies constantly
move up and down against each other. Yet the bankruptcy courts have not been
flooded by creditors objecting to losses from currency fluctuations. 165 In
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006) (stating that "the court... shall confirm the plan... if
the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of
claims or interests"); see also id. § 1 129(b)(2) (listing the requirements that make a plan "fair
and equitable").
162. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.04[4][b][C][ii], at 1129-107 (15th ed. rev. 2007).
163. The introduction of foreign creditors changes the context of the following statement
from Collier: "Valuation of property received by the senior classes varies with the type of
property involved. If cash is to be paid on the effective date, there is obviously no valuation
problem." Id. 1129.0414][a][C], at 1129-97. This statement is correct in a case where all the
creditors use the same currency. In a multinational case, however, cash raises a valuation
problem.
164. Id.
165. The author conducted a search in the Westlaw database of bankruptcy cases using the
following search terms: "currenc! /s crisis collapse devalu!" No cases were located in which a
creditor objected to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding because of foreign currency issues.
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response to such criticism, two points should be noted. First, the problem of
exchange rates is unavoidable. Second, the absence of foreign exchange
problems in bankruptcy courts may be due to the fact that nations applied a
territorial approach to bankruptcy prior to Chapter 15. 66 In other words, the
territorial approach insulated creditors from foreign exchange issues, and the
application of the Model Law will now expose creditors to these problems.
A. The Unavoidability of the Foreign Exchange Problem
Since 1973, economically advanced countries have operated under a global
system of floating exchange rates.167 Under this system, foreign exchange rates
are determined by supply and demand in the foreign exchange markets, as
opposed to a system where the rates are fixed at levels determined by national
However, the federal courts have seen cases involving parties hurt by severe currency
fluctuations. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926) (issue arising from
translation of monetary amount of claim from depreciated German marks to U.S. dollars); Hicks
v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925) (same); Allianz Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft Munich
Reinsurance Co. v. S.S. Eskisehir, 353 F. Supp. 84, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (objection to
proceeding in Turkey because judgment from Turkish court would result in a $466,000 loss due
to devaluation of Turkish lira).
These cases underscore the inherent problem when claims incurred in one currency are paid
in a different one. The issue of time and timing becomes crucial as the values of the currencies
fluctuate against each other over time. For example, in Humphrey, the issue was whether the
original claim for payment of German marks should be converted to U.S. dollars as of the date
of the demand for payment or some other date such as the date ofjudgment. Humphrey, 272
U.S. at 517-18. This issue was crucial because the value of the mark fell significantly between
the two dates. Id.
Because of currency fluctuation, the timing of currency conversion can be come the most
important issue.
Support may be found for at least seven different dates for converting foreign currency
damages into the money of the forum: the time of making the contract, the time of breach
or tort, the time of rescission, the time of commencing the suit, the time of trial, the time of
judgment, and the time of collection.
Note, Dollar Damage Awards to Foreign Plaintiffs: Conversion and Revaluation of Foreign
Currencies, 61 YALE L.J. 758, 759 n.5 (1952). A commonly accepted view is that:
Where a breach of contract occurs in a foreign country the damages shall be reckoned in
the money of that country at the date of breach and then converted into the money of the
forum at the date judgment is entered; but where a contract to deliver foreign money in
the country of the forum is broken, damages should be calculated in the money of the
forum as of the time of breach.
Note, Fluctuating Rates of Exchange and the Conflict of Laws, 40 HARV. L. REV. 619, 622
(1927).
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of Apr. 20, 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, title VIII, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146.
167. Paul Krugman, Exchange Rates, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (1st
ed.), http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/ExchangeRates.html (last visited Nov. 8,2008). Paul
Krugnan is a Professor of Economics at Princeton University.
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•168governments. Thus the value of traded currencies fluctuates as long as
foreign exchange markets are open. 169 The value of the traded currencies varies
from trade to trade, and the change in value can be dramatic over time.170
Because the value "floats" or changes over time, the value of a claim today in
the currency of the local bankruptcy court will change over time when valued in
the currency of a different country.1
7 1
168. Id.
A fixed, or pegged, rate is a rate the government (central bank) sets and maintains as the
official exchange rate. A set price will be determined against a major world currency
(usually the U.S. dollar, but also other major currencies such as the euro, the yen, or a
basket of currencies). In order to maintain the local exchange rate, the central bank buys
and sells its own currency on the foreign exchange market in return for the currency to
which it is pegged.
If, for example, it is determined that the value of a single unit of local currency is equal
to USD 3.00, the central bank will have to ensure that it can supply the market with those
dollars. In order to maintain the rate, the central bank must keep a high level of foreign
reserves. This is a reserved amount of foreign currency held by the central bank which it
can use to release (or absorb) extra funds into (or out of) the market. This ensures an
appropriate money supply, appropriate fluctuations in the market (inflation/deflation), and
ultimately, the exchange rate. The central bank can also adjust the official exchange rate
when necessary.
Reem Heakal, Floating and Fixed Exchange Rates, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/03/020603.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
Between 1870 and 1914, the major nations operated under a global fixed exchange rate that
linked the value of their currencies to gold. Id. The floating versus fixed system is not an "either
or" proposition. Id. Some countries may allow their currencies to float while other countries fix
their exchange rates. Id.
169. Heakal, supra note 168.
170. See id.
171. See Ronald A. Brand, Restructuring the U.S. Approach to Judgments on Foreign
Currency Liabilities: Building on the English Experience. 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 139 (1985).
Under the old system of fixed exchange rates, currency values could remain stable over long
periods. For example, from 1949 to 1966, the exchange rate between the British pound and the
U.S. dollar did not change. Krugman, supra note 167. The exchange rate remained unchanged
due to the major countries' adherence to the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,
which lasted from 1946 to 1973. Id. Under a global fixed rate system, the concems raised in this
Article would be reduced. Fixed exchange rates, however, do not guarantee stability because:
Fixed regimes ... can often lead to severe financial crises since a peg is difficult to
maintain in the long run. This was seen in the Mexican (1995), Asian and Russian (1997)
financial crises: an attempt to maintain a high value of the local currency to the peg
resulted in the currencies eventually becoming overvalued. This meant that the
governments could no longer meet the demands to convert the local currency into the
foreign currency at the pegged rate. With speculation and panic, investors scrambled to get
out their money and convert it into foreign currency before the local currency was devalued
against the peg; foreign reserve supplies eventually became depleted. In Mexico's case, the
government was forced to devalue the peso by 30%. In Thailand, the government
eventually had to allow the currency to float, and by the end of 1997, the bhat had lost its
2008] CHAPTER 15
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This global system of floating exchange rates is the reality against which all
transnational financial transactions take place, 172 including, of course, those
transactions within the scope of transnational bankruptcy proceedings. Hence
any transnational bankruptcy must take into account the effects of currency
fluctuations, particularly when it comes to the issue of the fair treatment of
creditors.
B. The Absence (To Date) of Foreign Exchange Problems in
Bankruptcy Cases
If foreign exchange problems are unavoidable, why have U.S. bankruptcy
courts not seen numerous cases presenting this problem? 173 One reason may be
value by 50% as the market's demand and supply readjusted the value of the local
currency.
Heakal, supra note 168.
172. See generally Brand, supra note 171 (discussing the risks that currency fluctuations
pose to transnational businesses).
173. It is beyond dispute that currency crises trigger severe economic distress. In
Argentina, for example, the 2001 peso devaluation wiped out personal savings, rendered debts
unserviceable, and closed businesses. See Howard La Franchi, Life in Argentina 's Free-Fall
Economy, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2002, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/021 l/p01 s03-woam.html%0A. This crisis generated litigation
in U.S. bankruptcy courts (although none of them reached the stage where objections to foreign
exchange treatment were raised). See, e.g., In re Bd. of Dir. of Telecom Arg., S.A., No. 06
Civ.2352 NRB, 2006 WL 3378687 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2006); In re Compania de Alimentos
Fargo, S.A., 376 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Bd. of Dir. of Multicanal S.A., 314
B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). In In re Multicanal, the court described the consequences of
the currency crisis suffered by the debtor:
Multicanal's restructuring can be traced to Argentina's recent economic collapse. In late
2001, following four years of economic recession, Argentina experienced 'the worst
economic crisis in its history.' In November 2001, in response to a run on the Argentine
banks, the government restricted access to bank deposits and instituted controls on foreign
exchange. In February 2002, in further response, the Argentine government allowed the
peso, which had been tied to the U.S. dollar on a one-to-one parity basis for the previous
ten years, to float. Over the next four months the peso's value decreased approximately
75% relative to the U.S. dollar. Restrictions on access to U.S. dollars and the sharp
devaluation of the peso made Multicanal's acquisition of programming from the United
States much more expensive and hindered its ability to make interest payments on its
substantial dollar-denominated debt obligations. This debt, representing substantially all of
Multicanal's debt for money borrowed, includes Bank debt and five series of U.S. dollar-
denominated notes (the "Notes") in an aggregate principal amount of U.S. $509 million. It
also represents about 97% of Multicanal's total debt; as of December 31,2003, trade debt
represented only about 3% of Multicanal's outstanding debt .... On February 1, 2002,
Multicanal defaulted on payments of principal and interest on certain of the Notes, and by
April 2002 Multicanal had defaulted on payments due on all five series of Notes. It also
defaulted on its Bank debt, which is also unsecured.
In re Multicanal, 314 B.R. at 492 (citations omitted).
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that the problem is overblown and that this Article takes an unnecessarily and
insupportably alarmist view of a theoretically possible but factually unlikely
scenario. An alternative explanation may be that the bankruptcy courts have not
seen this problem because the territorialist approach to transnational bankruptcy
has been the traditional and predominant approach. One overlooked benefit to
territorialism is the fact that local creditors have claims against local assets and
are therefore paid in local currency. 174 Thus, the foreign exchange problem
does not arise.
Even early efforts to address cross-border insolvencies implicitly
acknowledged the foreign exchange problem. 175 More importantly, these early
efforts also implicitly recognized that a territorial approach was necessary to• • 176
avoid foreign exchange problems. In the nineteenth century, a group of
South American countries ratified the Treaty on International Commercial Law,
which is known as the Montevideo Treaty of 1889.177 In the middle of the
twentieth century, a meeting was held to update and revise the 1889 treaty.'
78
This meeting resulted in the Treaty on International Commercial Terrestrial
Law and the Treaty on International Procedural Law, which became known as
the Montevideo Treaties of 1940.1 79 However, the Montevideo Treaties of 1940
were only ratified by Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 180
The purpose of both sets of Treaties was to harmonize insolvency laws on a
regional basis, not create a uniform substantive law for the ratifying• 181
countries. Thus, in that respect, the Treaties were similar to the Model
Law. 182 Also like the Model Law, the Treaties required each country to defer to
the jurisdiction of the court located in the place of the debtor's commercial
domicile. 183 This deference is comparable to the Model Law's recognition of a
foreign main proceeding in the country where the debtor has its center of main
interests. 
184
174. See generally Chung, supra note 1, at 93 (describing territorialism).
175. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 273-314 (discussing the efforts of various
countries, usually located in close geographic proximity to one another, to better regulate cross-
border insolvencies through bilateral treaties.)
176. Id. at 277-78. For example, the Montevideo Treaty of 1889 provided that when a
debtor has two or more commercial establishments in different countries, the courts of each
country are able to retain bankruptcy proceedings in respect to each one of them. Id.
177. Id. at 276-77. This group included Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
Id. at 276. Colombia acceded to the treaty in 1933. Id.
178. Id. at 276-77.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 277.
181. Id. at 276.
182. See MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY pmbl. (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law 2007) (stating the purpose and objectives of the Model Law).
183. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 277 (noting that "[u]nder the principle of unity all the
assets of the debtor, including those located in other states, are placed under the jurisdiction of
the court of the commercial domicile by virtue of the opening there of insolvency proceedings").
184. MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY pt. 1, ch. 1, art.20 (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
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A major difference, however, between the Model Law and the Montevideo
Treaties is that the Montevideo Treaties expressly favored local creditors over
foreign creditors.18 5 For example, § 44 of the Montevideo Treaty of 1889
provides:
The preferential rights of local creditors in the country in which bankruptcy
has been opened, if acquired prior to its declaration, shall be respected even
in the case where the property over which the preferential right can be
asserted has been removed to another State in which a bankruptcy l%%ceeding
or civil action against the same bankrupt is currently in progress.
Similarly, Article 20 of the Montevideo Treaty of International Procedural
Law of 1940 provides:
In the cases mentioned in Article 17, the local creditors, within a period of
sixty days immediately after the last publication provided for in Article 19,
may ask for insolvency proceedings against the debtor, with respect to
property located in their own country. In these instances, just as in cases
involving a single insolvency hearing which is held before the tribunals and
according to the laws of the country of the debtor's domicile, the local
creditors shall have preferential rights in iard to property located in the
territory where their claims should be 
met.
This explicit preference of local creditors over foreign creditors runs
counter to one of the fundamental goals of the Model Law and Chapter 15.
Section 1513(a) provides that "[f]oreign creditors have the same rights
regarding the commencement of, and participation in, a case under this title as
188domestic creditors." Section 1513(b)(1) provides,
Subsection (a) does not change or codify present law as to the priority of
claims under section 507 or 726, except that the claim of a foreign
creditor under those sections shall not be given a lower priority than that of
Trade Law 2007) (stating the effect of a court's recognition of a foreign representative's petition
for a foreign main proceeding).
185. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 278 (stating that bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to
the Montevideo Treaties were to be conducted "without prejudice to the rights accorded to the
local creditors").
186. Id. at 602 (unofficial translation by Professor Fletcher). At the time of the Montevideo
Treaty of 1889, the bankruptcy laws of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru differentiated
between domestic and foreign creditors in the case of concurrent bankruptcies and granted
domestic creditors a priority on the assets to be distributed in the domestic bankruptcy. See
Nadelmann, supra note 28, at 69.
187. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 605 (trans. by J. Irizarry y Puente and Gwladys L.
Williams).
188. 11 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (2006).
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general unsecured claims y{Ivout priority solely because the holder of such
claim is a foreign creditor.
These provisions ensuring the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign
creditors are a distinct feature of the Model Law and Chapter 15. As Professor
Fletcher observes,
Although the insolvency laws of many States make no overt distinction
between the rights and status of domestic and foreign creditors, it is seldom
the case that an express provision is included to confirm that foreign creditors
enjoy full rights of participation in local proceedings on equal terms with
their domestic counterparts.... Article 13 of the Model Law supplies the
means to overcome this problem by generating an explicit provision in the
law of the enacting State that foreign creditors have the same rights as local
creditors reigding the commencement of, and participation in, an insolvency
proceeding.
Non-discriminatory treatment of foreign creditors would seem to be a
desirable and necessary feature of any system intended to address transnational
bankruptcies. Indeed, it seems peculiar that a multinational approach would
expressly permit unequal treatment. Yet that is what the Montevideo Treaties
permit. 19 1 This aspect of the Treaties has generated pointed criticism.
192
Professor Fletcher described the Treaties as "openly flawed by a discriminatory
rule favouring local creditors." 193 He went on to observe that "[t]he reference to
the exercise of rights in conformity with the local law thus becomes the basis
for a perpetuation of the notorious tradition, under the laws of many Latin
American states, of blatant discrimination against foreign creditors." 1 4
Why would a treaty enshrine discrimination against foreign creditors? Is
it due to xenophobia? Is it due to irremediable provincialism? 9 6 The answer
189. Id. § 1513(b)(1).
190. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 476.
191. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Concurrent Bankruptcies and Creditor Equality in the
Americas, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 171, 180-84 (1948) (detailing the priority afforded local creditors
under the Montevideo Treaties when concurrent domestic and foreign bankruptcy proceedings
have been initiated) [hereinafter Nadelmann, Concurrent Bankruptcies].
192. See id. at 178-86.
193. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 282.
194. Id.
195. The origin of both Treaties' discriminatory language is known to the following extent:
It all started in 1857 when Eduardo Acevedo of Uruguay and Dalmacio Velez Sarsfield of
Argentina included in their draft of a commercial code for the Province of Buenos Aires a
provision to the effect that, when bankruptcy is declared within the country and abroad, in
the domestic bankruptcy the creditors within the country shall be paid in full before
creditors of the foreign bankruptcy may take part in the distributions. The provision
became the law of Argentina and passed also into the law of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru.
Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Report on the Montevideo Conference and CreditorDiscrimination, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 994 (1952). However, the source of the idea for the drafters is unknown. Id.
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may be something less sinister and based on a practical reality, perhaps the
reality of foreign exchange fluctuation. 197 One commentator has suggested that
preference is given to local creditors to protect them from foreign exchange
.... 198
losses relating to a foreign insolvency proceeding. The preference for local
creditors would ensure that local assets would be available for their claims. The
availability of local assets removes foreign exchange risk. Perhaps the Latin
American countries were motivated less by ill will toward foreigners and more
by the realities of currency fluctuations.
To be sure, it may be the case that the territorial approach limits the ability
of creditors to maximize their returns in situations where a large part of the
available assets are located in a different country. In such cases, the
universalists would argue that the avoidance of foreign exchange problems is a
heavy price to pay if what is lost is the ability to recover significantly more
through a unified bankruptcy proceeding.19 9 The universalists would argue that
the creditor was cutting off its nose to spite its face. Whether this is true will, of
course, depend on the facts of each individual case, and there will undoubtedly
196. The most commonly accepted explanation seems to be that preference for local
creditors is based on an explicit desire to protect local parties and that such protection is
necessary because other jurisdictions protect their creditors. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Foreign and
Domestic Creditors in Bankruptcy Proceedings. Remnants of Discrimination?, 91 U. PA. L.
REv. 601, 612, 619 (1943).
197. Nadelmann, Concurrent Bankruptcies, supra note 191, at 179.
198. Id. at 179. Nadelmann acknowledges the argument that preference of local creditors
may be needed for this reason, but immediately rejects it by asserting that the "hotchpot' rule by
itself is sufficient to protect local creditors. Id. The "hotchpot" rule provides that:
[A] creditor, who has recovered payment abroad and wants to prove in the domestic
bankruptcy for any further claim he may have, must throw into the common fund what he
has received in the foreign country. In other words, his share is calculated on the basis of
an estate in which the money recovered abroad is included.
Id. at 172. Professor Fletcher, in turn, describes the "hotchpot" rule as follows:
A creditor who seeks to participate in a process of distribution taking place under the law
of a given jurisdiction must furnish a full account of any payment that has already been
received in respect of the same claim in any foreign proceeding. On the basis of this
disclosure, the creditor is not allowed to receive a payment of dividend after lodging proof
of claim as long as the payment received by the other creditors of the same class is
proportionately less than the payment the creditor has already received. By this means, de
facto equality of treatment of creditors is maintained according to the rules of distribution
followed in the jurisdiction where the Hotchpot rule is applied.
FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 485.
Nadelman's argument, however, does not take into account that there will likely be a time
lag, say, between the time of payment in Argentinian currency in an Argentinian proceeding and
the valuation of that payment for purposes of the "hotchpot" rule in a Bolivian proceeding.
What happens if the Argentinian and Bolivian currencies have fluctuated wildly against each in
that time period? Thus, the "hotchpot" rule does not adequately address the foreign exchange
problem.
199. See infra Part L.A and accompanying notes for a general description of the universalist
approach.
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be cases where local creditors may reap much larger benefits through a Model
Law proceeding even if currency losses are sustained.
The key point, however, is that foreign exchange problems now need to be
addressed due to the Model Law and Chapter 15, unlike when territorialism
was the prevailing approach. Creditors are not indifferent to currencies; they do
indeed care about the currency with which they are paid.20 There has been
little, if any, discussion in scholarly literature dealing with this issue, but any
large Chapter 15 case will be forced to address the problem.
C. Is the Foreign Exchange Problem a Legal Problem?
Losses due to foreign exchange risk present a real-world, factual problem
for creditors, but do these losses also give rise to a legal problem? In other
words, does a foreign exchange loss provide the basis for a legal objection? The
universalists would argue that as long as all unsecured creditors, local or
foreign, receive the same pro rata distribution in the currency of the
distribution, then equal treatment has been achieved because "[t]he principle of
equality between identically situated creditors is fundamental under U.S.
insolvency law. '' 201 And the universalists would argue that this principle is
satisfied if all unsecured creditors receive the same percentage of recovery. 202
However, does the determination of equality end upon distribution in the home
country's currency or does equality take into account losses from currency
translation?
VI. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF SOLVING THE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEM
The universalists may attempt to dismiss the foreign exchange problem by
arguing that there is a quick and easy fix. They would, after all, correctly point
out that multinational businesses deal with fluctuating currencies every day.
The quick and easy fix would be for the bankruptcy trustee to buy futures
200. This concern over currency of payment is not just a matter of high finance for Wall
Street professionals. In early 2008, the Taj Mahal stopped accepting U.S. dollars as payment for
its entrance fee because of the dollar's decline in value. Michelle Higgins, The Greenback is
Losing Global Appeal, N.Y. TRMES, Feb. 3, 2008, Travel, at 6. Some retailers in New York are
attracting mainstream media attention because they recently began accepting euros as payment
due to the euro's strength against the dollar. Tom Leonard, Euros Do Nicelyfor New York Store
Owners, DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 12, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/
news/2008/02/08/wslump208.xml.
201. In reBd. of Dir. of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 518-19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 541 (1946) and Sampsell v. Imperial
Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941)). In determining whether to defer to a foreign
insolvency proceeding, "a court must look to certain indicia of fairness, including 'whether
creditors of the same class are treated equally in the distribution of assets."' Id. at 519.
202. See infra Part L.A and accompanying notes for a general description of the universalist
approach.
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contracts in the foreign exchange markets to hedge against fluctuation. In a
non-bankruptcy context, this solution was identified by a federal court in a case
where arties objected to their awards on the grounds of foreign exchange
losses.
In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz generated numerous claims for damages
resulting from an oil spill.204 The court made the following observation
regarding the ability to protect against foreign exchange fluctuations:
As soon as the court announces the award, the parties may eliminate
exchange risk by using the currency futures markets. For example, if PIL
wants to hedge against the risk that the pound will fall against the dollar, it
can buy a dollar futures contract, promising to pay in sterling. When Amoco
satisfies the judgment with sterling, & can close its futures position and
receive the dollar value of the award.
The universalists would argue that this observation may be used as a
roadmap by a bankruptcy trustee to protect foreign creditors. However, this
solution falls significantly short of being a complete solution because, in certain
instances, hedging risk is impracticable and, in others, it is impossible.
The ability to hedge does not solve the foreign exchange issue because it is
impracticable. In many instances, a trustee will not know how much to hedge or
which currency to hedge. 206 The following hypothetical illustrates this problem.
203. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978,954
F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
204. Id. at 1288-89.
205. Id. at 1327.
206. In order to hedge foreign currency exposure, it is necessary to know the amount of
currency to hedge and the period of time during which protection is needed. See PAUL BISHOP &
DON DIXON, FOREIGN EXCHANGE HANDBOOK 317-24 (1992).
In every futures contract, everything is specified: the quantity and quality of the
commodity, the specific price per unit, and the date and method of delivery. The "price" of
a futures contract is represented by the agreed-upon price of the underlying commodity or
financial instrument that will be delivered in the future.
Futures Fundamentals: How the Market Works, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/futures/futures2.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). An indication of the difficulties of
hedging is described as follows:
Another alternative for translation exposure hedging involves using profit or loss from
foreign exchange contracts to offset a gain or loss on translation. There are, however,
several possible problems. The first is that the translation exposure to be hedged is
unknown at the time the contracts must be negotiated .... For this reason it is very
difficult to achieve a zero-position hedge.
BISHOP & DIXON, supra note 206, at 378.
Another difficulty with forward contracts is posed by forecasting issues. For instance,
[T]he forward price may already be part or all of the way from the current spot to where
the future spot will be. Since the gain or loss on the contract depends on the difference
between the forward and the future spot prices, it will be necessary to position many more
units of currency in the forward contract than are exposed on translation. If this is the case,
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Suppose the debtor is an American company seeking bankruptcy protection
in the United States because it has been overwhelmed by tort claims from
American, Canadian, and Mexican claimants. The debtor has obtained
recognition of the American proceeding as the foreign main proceeding and the
foreign claimants have been forced to pursue their claims in U.S. bankruptcy207
court. The court establishes a procedure to resolve the claims. The debtor
disputes liability and is confident that it can defeat some, but not all, claims.
Suppose that the debtor has a viable future income stream that can be applied to
the claims. How much in Canadian dollars and Mexican pesos should the
trustee hedge? Will he or she need to hedge in Canadian dollars or Mexican
pesos at all?
The inability to answer these questions is due to the fact that the claims are
disputed. Will the court award the claimants 50% of their claimed amounts?
Will half of the claimants be awarded anything? Of those who receive an
award, how many will be Canadian, and how many will be Mexican? And what
will be the amounts awarded to the Canadians or Mexicans? Without knowing
these answers, how can the trustee hedge?20 8 The problem is further
compounded by the fact that there is no deadline by which the trustee must
object to a claim.20 9
then the hedge will only produce a zero outcome if the future spot turns out to be exactly
as forecast. The success of the hedge depends, therefore, on forecasting (speculation) with
respect to the future spot.
Id. Perhaps there are financial products, other than forward contracts, that reduce or eliminate
such forecasting risk or that generally provide a more certain way to hedge. Regardless of the
availability of other products, the trustee still needs to know how much to hedge and the time
period to be covered.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1509 (2006) (giving foreign representatives access to U.S. bankruptcy
courts).
208. It requires expertise to know how to hedge in foreign exchange markets. See BISHOP &
DIXON, supra note 206, at 329-36. Thus, a trustee will need to hire an expert, which is another
administrative expense. See id. at 415 (extolling the benefits of outside assistance and
consulting arrangements). Additionally, there is a price to pay for purchasing hedging
instruments in the markets; hedging is not a cost-free exercise. See Douglas Cumming & Sophia
Johan, Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 783, 796, 805 (2008)
(describing the costs associated with hedging).
Moreover, a hypothetical involving only three countries may be oversimplified. The largest
multinational businesses operate in dozens of countries. Is it practical or feasible for a trustee to
hedge dozens of currencies? Moreover, creditor claims in some countries may be in the millions
or billions of dollars, but claims in other countries may only be in the thousands of dollars. Does
it make economic sense to hedge $100,000 in claims?
209. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRupTCY 502.02[3][e], at 502-17 to -18 (15th ed. rev. 2007).
Collier observes,
Rule 3007 [of the Bankruptcy Rules] sets no time period within which the trustee must
object to the allowance of a claim. A cutoff date would be inappropriate, for in many cases
it may not be known until late in the administration of the case whether there will be any
dividend and consequently, whether a useful purpose would be served by a trustee making
an objection.
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Suppose further that the amount available for distribution will depend on
whether the trustee is able to avoid a security interest asserted by a large
secured creditor. Suppose that the collateral at issue is worth millions of dollars
and that the outcome of the § 544(a) challenge could significantly increase the• • 210
amount available for unsecured creditors. Again, the trustee would not know
how much currency exposure to hedge because that amount will depend on the
outcome of the avoidance litigation.
There are financial products that are used every day to hedge currency
risk. 2 12 However, it is unclear whether a bankruptcy trustee can effectively
utilize these products to protect foreign creditors from currency risk.2 13 In many
cases, there will be a significant time lag between the filing date and the
distribution date, and the duration of that period may be unknowable.
Additionally, the trustee may not be in a position to know the amount to hedge,
in large part because the amount may turn on the trustee's ability toprevail on
claim objections, avoidance and preference actions, and the like. At best,
currency hedging may rovide an incomplete and imperfect way to address
foreign exchange risk.
CONCLUSION
One of the claimed benefits of Chapter 15 is that it will simplify the
administration of transnational bankruptcies.2 1 6 "One court, one law" does
seem to possess an intuitive simplicity, and simplicity (and the related notion of
predictability) is what the UNCITRAL working group was trying to achieve
Id.
210. See 11U.S.C. § 544(a).
211. See BISHOP & DIXON, supra note 206, at 407-34 (explaining the various factors to be
considered when deciding whether and how to hedge).
212. See, e.g., PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL TERMS 270 (1999) (giving examples of hedging instruments).
213. RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, THE CONVERTIBLE
CURRENCY SYSTEM 87-88 (1979) (noting the difficulties and inherent risks of hedging).
214. See SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ETAL., INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 96 (2001).
215. Currency hedging also raises a variety of issues concerning the involvement and
competing interests of unsecured creditors in a case. Suppose a group of foreign unsecured
creditors in a Chapter 15 case urged the trustee to hedge their currency exposure and agreed that
any losses or gains from currency exposure would be allocated among them. It is an open issue
whether the domestic creditors would agree to the hedge. Hedging costs money, and any money
used to hedge would mean less available for distribution to the domestic creditors. This conflict
of interests may result in the need to appoint separate committees of unsecured creditors in order
to ensure adequate representation of the different creditor groups. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 102(a)(2).
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court will be called upon to resolve the dispute because any purchase
of hedging instruments would likely be a use of the property of the estate other than in the
ordinary course of business. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
216. See Westbook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 22, at 714.
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and urge upon national legislatures.2 17 In order to achieve this goal, the
working group did what it could to gloss over national differences. 218 As an
example, the working group created its own terminology for the Model Law, so
that the terminology would not be identified with any particular country.
219
However, there are limits to what a working group can do to change the world.
Insolvency law is just one small part of the global dynamic of international
commerce. The effect of any attempt to adjust or tweak the insolvency issues
will be limited by the much larger effects of the more important and• 220
overpowering foreign exchange issues. The insolvency tail will not wag the
foreign exchange dog.
Despite (or because of) the best intentions of any U.N. working group, "one
court, one law" ultimately means that creditors from all over the world will
assemble in one courtroom seeking repayment. Regardless of any working
group's desires for harmonization and modernization, these creditors will care
deeply about what they receive for their claims. They will want to know
whether they will be paid and what pieces of paper will they receive. For many
of them, the answers to these questions will be unsatisfactory. Even though
many of them conduct their financial affairs in one currency (their local
currency), their claims will be paid in a different currency. This is the result
even if the original transaction creating the debt was purely local with the
expectation that the repayment would be in local currency. Universalism's
217. Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 24, at 476.
218. Id. at478.
219. Id. at 498-99. "In addition to the obvious political advantage of avoiding
identification of UNCITRAL's products with any particular legal system, this also has the
juridical effect of detaching national actors, such as legislatures and judges, from standard
interpretations of terms in their own legal traditions." Id. at 499.
220. Id. at 512. The overarching importance of foreign exchange issues was demonstrated
by the need for, and issues surrounding, the creation of the euro. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROSYSTEM, THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 5
(2006), http://www.ecb.eu/pub/html/index.en.html. The EU countries recognized that they
would be unable to create a single market without a common currency. Id. at 8. The European
Central Bank states:
With the birth of the euro, foreign exchange transaction costs and foreign exchange risks
were eliminated within the euro area. In the past, these costs and risks hindered
competition across borders. Increased competition makes it more likely that available
resources will be used in the most efficient way. With a single currency, investment
decisions are much easier, as fluctuations in the exchange rate can no longer influence the
return on investment across national borders within the euro area.
Id. at 9. In other words, if the goal is to promote and enhance international trade (which is
UNCITRAL's stated mission), a common currency is essential to remove barriers. Tweaking
cross-border insolvency rules is nothing more than making minor adjustments at the margins.
More importantly, and as this Article has attempted to explain, attempting to internationalize
insolvency law without taking into account the larger and more important fact that the world
does not have a common currency may have the unintended effect of creating problems that did
not exist before.
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efforts to simplify matters by focusing on "one law" have the unavoidable
effect of complicating matters by creating unwanted foreign exchange risk for
creditors. If simplicity is the goal, whose life has been simplified?
Moreover, for a body of law that is presumably designed to address the
most difficult financial circumstances, Chapter 15 is surprisingly fragile. It
appears that the conditions must be "just right" for it to have viability. Foreign
exchange rates must be stable in order to avoid prejudice to foreign creditors. If
transnational insolvencies are created by currency crisis and collapse, Chapter
15 appears unsuited to address such situations. It is not even certain that
Chapter 15 is able to deal with normal currency fluctuations. It is a curious
position for a set of bankruptcy laws.
